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Preface
During my first semester at Bucknell, a professor of mine assigned environmental
historian William Cronon’s essay titled “The Trouble with Wilderness”, a piece that questions
the authority of the society vs. nature divide that pervades environmental relations today. The
essay is thought provoking, and at the time of its publication in 1995, was fairly novel in the
realm of scholarship examining interactions between human civilization and natural systems. As
a first-year environmental studies student with a hardline preservationist attitude, I found it
groundbreaking. As I sat in the library with my highlighter and the essay, it was like Cronon had
thrown in front of me the solution to the environmental crisis that continuously haunted me; do
away with the human-nature divide and a whole new world opens. He posits that if rid ourselves
of the distinction between human and nature, and cease to glorify certain areas as untouched
wilderness, then opportunities to value all space as important come to life, leading to a more
harmonious existence of what we see as the human and the natural. This suggestion is still salient
even in the present where the topic has been elaborated over and over again. It proposes a new
perspective and a new way to go about our daily lives, seeing inherent value in all living things.
For me however, the truly fascinating aspect of the essay, was its suggestion that “nature” was
not a concrete place, but was rather something fluid, which was arbitrarily constructed.
Both unfortunately and fortunately, the following years at Bucknell have shown me that a
change in perspective is likely just one small piece of the puzzle when it comes to global
“environmental” problems. What has remained constant however, is my questioning of the term
“nature”. I went through one particular phase where I was deeply unsettled that that the term at
the heart of my discipline of “environmental” studies appeared to be something that simply
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didn’t exist. In the course of a few years I had gone from seeing the natural world as something
completely separate from humanity, defined by a certain type of inherent value in its untouched
state, to seeing the natural world as artifice, produced by capitalist expansion and violent colonial
processes. Fortunately, my intellectual journey did not end there. In the spring of 2017 I left for
Tanzania to participate in a semester of critical conservation study. Unsurprisingly I returned
with more questions than answers. I did come back however, with a sense of newfound
excitement for a discipline that sought to explore the questions I was fixated on; political
ecology.
This thesis, like my intellectual formation as an undergraduate student, has been a long
work in progress. Its regional focus was informed by my interest in East African politics, yet its
central case study seemed to fall into my lap through the haphazard choice of a Netflix
documentary one night of my sophomore year. It is also however, an expression of my belief that
now, after 4 years, I can begin to provide my own answer to the question “what is nature”.
Political ecology approaches put forward the idea that social systems and environmental
problems cannot be separated. As I saw time and time again in Tanzania, contemporary
conservation is not simply the way society seeks to preserve endangered biodiversity; it is an
expression of colonialism, a capitalist tool, and reinforcement of hegemonic western ideals of
nature, and a driver of dispossession and economic depravity. It is also at times, however, a
pursuit enacted with the best of intentions.
That night in 2015, as I sat in bed watching the “Virunga” documentary, I saw all of the
above: colonial narratives, capitalism, and commodification. At the same time though I saw an
ecosystem bursting with life, and portrayals of genuine human-nonhuman relationships. I don’t
claim to provide any answers in this thesis about what can be done to fix global patterns of

viii
environmental degradation and exploitative capitalist expansion. I do, however, seek to
problematize hegemonic western ideals of a “perfect wilderness” in order to make more room for
marginalized ideas of what “the natural” has the potential to be. This thesis is an expression of
my own analytical voice, but also my renderings of the voices of those who have influenced me,
and taught me that the ability to think critically, and to question the world around you, is perhaps
the greatest life skill a liberal arts education can provide.
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Abstract
The recent western media attention surrounding Virunga National Park in the Democratic
Republic of Congo has brought up significant scholarly questions about the discursive portrayal
of “ideal” Natures. In this thesis, I undertake a discursive analysis of western media materials
about Virunga National Park in order to understand how ideas of Nature are transnationally
constructed. In doing this, I undertake an analysis of the western oriented discursive material
associated with three socio-political processes within the park: green militarization, conservation,
and the ecotourist industry. Ultimately, I conclude that the discursive material portrays a highly
spectacularized and commodified “ideal” nature, which is consumed by western viewers, thus
reinforcing the marginalization of alternative notions of the “natural” by global hegemonic
forces. Drawing from alternative ideas of the “natural”, I highlight that in a world increasingly
enveloped by what scholars coin “capitalist ruination”, finding ways to problematize ideal nature
discourses, such as those demonstrated through a study of Virunga, and thus develop new ways
of thinking about human and nonhuman relationships is imperative.

xi
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Introduction: Virunga, Conservation and Contradiction

In April of 2014, the release of Netflix’s documentary film “Virunga” thrust the
Democratic Republic of Congo’s, Virunga National Park, into the western mass media spotlight.
The film, which chronicles the plight of the Virunga mountain gorillas, and the Virunga park
authorities fight against the seemingly villainous British Oil Company “SOCO”, triggered an
international outpouring of support, both on social media and in the form of donations. Taken at
face value, this mobilization appears commendable, and like most contemporary conservation
efforts, was likely rooted in genuine good intentions.
Good intentions however, do not always yield desirable results. The film, filled with
racial tropes and militarized spectacle, produces a view of the park that is completely separate
from the realities of conservation practice in the Democratic Republic of Congo today. Yet, due
to the dominance of western media discourses, the problems with such a representation are not
readily apparent to the non-critical eye. Attempts to conserve endangered species and to protect
wilderness areas are afforded a type of moral exceptionalism within western societies, thus
proving largely un-criticized beyond the academy. After all, what type of person would object to
efforts to save baby African Elephants? or to protecting the Giant Panda?
In the face of an eager acceptance of contemporary conservation practice by western
consumers, exploring the realities of protected areas, and problematizing the discourses which
claim to represent those lived realities becomes increasingly important. First, in a world where
the consequences of fortress conservation model may be devastating for communities that live in
proximity to protected areas, unearthing the realities of such abuses is imperative from a human
rights perspective. For example, in the film “Virunga”, though we are presented with images of
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armed park guards and of enforcement of park boundaries, we are never shown the impacts of
such enforcement on the livelihoods of those who live in or around Virunga National Park.
Second, looking past popular media representations of conservation may allow for a more
accurate ecological evaluation of the effectiveness of efforts to save global biodiversity, as more
focus is placed on the geophysical nuances of individual ecosystems. Lastly, and most
significantly for my analysis, discourses which emerge from protected areas, and parks like
Virunga, have the potential to shape the larger ways in which society conceptualizes nature. An
examination of media surrounding Virunga National Park presents a unique opportunity to
interrogate the ways in which different conservation discourses propagate limited imaginaries in
the western world of what “nature” is. As I will outline, the consequences of such limited
conceptions of the natural are significant, especially when considering precarious ecological
futures and rapidly changing nature-society relationships.
The purpose of this thesis is to explore the ways in which western oriented discourses
emerge from Virunga, and the potential impact that such discursive formations may have upon
how western societies think about nature. While this piece centers around a central case study, it
explores transnational ideas. That is, this thesis deals with ideas which are not contained by the
boundaries of the nation-state, nor in this case, by continental borders. My chosen case study
provides a crucial starting point for these transnational ideas. In this thesis, using Virunga
National Park as a center-point, I explore three main categories of discursive production: Green
militarization and the fortress conservation model (FMC), Mountain Gorillas and the
commodification of the non-human body, and ecotourism and the performative production of
national natures. I preface these three discussions with a theoretical introduction (Chapter 1) and
historical background (Chapter 2 and 3). These foundations are then followed by what is best
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thought of as a series of three interconnected essays, each exploring a unique social or political
process within the park. Methodologically, I employ critical discourse analysis, which I will
continue to discuss in subsequent chapters in order to conduct this examination.
In the first essay (Chapter 4), I explore legacies of fortress conservation within Virunga,
and the promotion of exclusionary land use policies. Situating my argument within scholarly
discussions of green military practice, neoliberal conservation, and the “spectacular mediation”
of conservation, I explore the ways in which militarization operates in the park, both historically
and in the present day. Drawing from historical archives and previous scholarly work performed
in the park by authors such as Marijnen and Verweijen (2016; 2016; 2017; 2018), I focus on the
archetype of the wildlife ranger in Virunga. Ultimately, I conclude, through an analysis of media
sources, that the militarized actions, and oftentimes premature deaths, of Virunga’s rangers are
heavily spectacularized through western discursive production, creating imagery which depicts
them as swilling “conservation martyrs”. As a result, I argue, the spectacle of their sacrifice can
be capitalized on, to fund further militarization and park operation.
In the second essay (Chapter 5), I address the deployment of Virunga’s Mountain
Gorillas as a mechanism to garner international conservation support, in the form of funding and
popular engagement. Drawing from work on non-human agency, such as Lorimer’s conception
of charisma, scholarly discussions of “flagship” species, and an application of Brockington and
Scholfield’s “conservationist mode of production” (2010), I argue that the mountain gorilla is
archetyped and marketed by the various western medias surrounding Virunga, and is therefore
rendered a tool through which to accrue popular support and donations. I analyze materials such
as websites, news media, and books, to examine the ways in which the charisma of the mountain
gorilla is capitalized on and cultivated. Ultimately, I discuss how commodification of the
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mountain gorilla for conservation aims ultimately removes any potential for the recognition of
nonhuman agency, and thus a more cohesive human-animal existence, with additional
consequences for material efforts to conserve Virunga’s gorillas.
The third essay focuses on the recent manifestation of ecotourism in Virunga. I begin by
analyzing how ecotourism appears in the park and how it has developed over the last decade.
Then, using the work of scholars who take a critical approach to ecotourism development, such
as Duffy (2013) and Lisle (2004), I begin to discuss the ways in which tourism, as an economic
venture, requires a unique performance of the nation state in order to attract visitors. Drawing on
examples from websites, travel reviews, and advertisements for ecotourism in Virunga, I apply
ideas of the “consumption of catastrophe” in tourist ventures to demonstrate that the promotion
of tourism in the park has required a further vilification of human political activity in the Congo,
and a return to “heart of darkness” imagery. In this way, I propose that the ideas of a “morally
innocent” nature, which are produced in order to promote ecotourism in Virunga, further damage
human lives in the area, as well as promote “primitive” tropes of the African continent.
The purpose of these three analyses and this thesis as a whole is to provide a critical
evaluation of the mainstream discursive formations produced via conservation in Virunga. I
critique three major categories of discourse, grounding my criticism in the aforementioned
scholarly works within the realm of political ecology. With regard to Virunga, scholars such as
Marijnen and Verweijen (2015, 2016, 2017) have critically evaluated the discursive legitimation
specifically of conservation militarization in the park. In a more general sense too, scholars such
as Büscher (2016) have analyzed the way that the “othering” of those involved in wildlife
“crime” in South Africa manifests via discourse produced in social media.1 Although, my thesis
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follows a number of the same methodological principles as these works, instead of placing a
focus on the legitimation of militarization in conservation, I instead choose to center my critique
on the ability of conservation discourse to produce specific hegemonic conceptions of “the
natural”.2
My main and unique contribution to the literature then, is to identify the natures which
are co-produced via discursive formations in Virunga. I argue that the consumption of this
discourse fosters the dominant re-inscribing of wilderness narratives by the western world. I find
that the “natures” suggested through the discursive processes that I choose to analyze are
overwhelmingly dualistic, and promote limited imaginaries of what future human-nonhuman
coexistence may look like. I also find that the natures produced in relation to Virunga are
embedded in colonial processes, and rely heavily upon affective commodification of living
beings, human bodily exploitation, and are in and of themselves performative. I argue then that
the “nature” produced via discursive processes in Virunga is ultimately damaging to the people
who live around the park and work inside it, for the nonhumans who reside in the park, and more
broadly, limits conceptions of more inclusive forms of “the natural”. Above all, this thesis is a
critique of existing discursive productions. I do point to alternatives to this oppressive nature,
highlighting the work of scholars such as Whatmore (2001), Escobar (1999), Lorimer (2007),

1

Büscher’s article “Rhino Poaching is Out of Control! Violence, race and the politics of hysteria in online
conservation” (2016), along with Marijnen and Verweijen’s piece “Selling green militarization: the discursive
(re)production of militarized conservation in Virunga National Park, Democratic Republic of Congo”, have
both served as methodological guideposts and intellectual inspiration for my thesis. I view my work as a
theoretical expansion of their analyses, with a specific focus on the discursive production of “nature”.
2
There is a large body of scholarly work that seeks to investigate militarized natures and the nuances of
fortress conservation. While I do to an extent engage with such ideas, my focus is on the discursive formations
produced by militarized conservation practice, as opposed to the reciprocal legitimation of militarized
conservation via discourse. Though the two are not mutually exclusive, I analyze one part of what can be seen
as a discursive cycle.
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and Tsing (2015), and incorporate their vision of nature-society coexistence into my analysis.
Although I will continue to discuss the logics for the discursive material I have chosen to
use, it is worth mentioning now that this thesis is only an exploration of specific discourses
emanating from Virunga National Park, and conservation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo. Although I am not able to address discursive material produced by residents in close
proximity to the park, or perhaps by individual park officials, I believe that is it still extremely
valuable to problematize the “westernized” material produced in association with the park. In
this sense, I refer not entirely to the geographic “west”, but rather to nations in an economic and
political position to produce (and reproduce) hegemonic ideas of nature, even if those same ideas
are not globally universal. The increasing neoliberalization of conservation by colonial forces
has necessitated that protected areas in the global south “market” themselves to consumers in the
global north via avenues in mainstream media, or face ecological devastation. This selling of
conservation practice however, produces images of what an ideal “nature” looks like, and those
images are then internalized and reproduced by the culturally hegemonic western world.
This thesis is therefore more about the mediation and discursive implications of the park
than it is about the lived experiences of the people who reside and work there. My choice, to
interrogate the mainstream western discourses emanating from Virunga National Park, is rooted
in a belief that the “ideal” Nature being promoted is theoretically problematic, damaging to
human and non-human lives, and capable of overshadowing more inclusive understandings of
ecological coexistence. In doing so, I hope that attention can be brought to marginalized ideas of
nature, which have routinely been overwritten by both the colonial project and late capitalist
processes.
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Chapter I: Un “Earthing” a New Nature

“For at the very moment that the ‘human mastery of nature’ appears to have arrived, so the
safety net that holds ‘us’ (humans) and ‘them’ (other animals) apart unravels as the instruments
of this supposed mastery render our own species genome just one more entry in the vast
informatic menagerie of life science.”
(Sarah Whatmore in Hybrid Geographies)

William Cronon and A Brief History of Wilderness
For those unfamiliar with the nuances of environmental studies today, the idea of
“nature” as a controversial term may seem strange. Indeed, the idea of an independent “natural
world” which exists apart from human civilization has proven contentious amongst
environmental scholars over the past two decades. In this section, I explore the origins of the idea
of nature, pointing to different scholarly contributions, in order to provide a foundation through
which to understand the myriad of ways nature comes to be discursively constructed within
Virunga National Park.
In a scholarly sense, the quest to define and deconstruct “nature” has now been labeled as
a primary aim of political ecology (Escobar 1999, Whatmore 2009 in Gregory 2009). Ideas of a
world separate from human civilization have long permeated Western literature, religion, and
society. Relatedly, Williams, in “Problems in Material and Culture” notes that “the idea of nature
contains, though often unnoticed, an extraordinary amount of human history”. Many scholars
have engaged with ideas of a “constructivist nature”, but a particularly accessible jumping off
point (and my original entry way to understanding the debate about nature) appears in the form
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of Cronon’s seminal essay “The Trouble with Wilderness”. In the essay, Cronon begins by
pointing out that ideas of wilderness originally appeared primarily from a biblical context
(Cronon 1995). In this way, “wilderness” was not a pristine escape from the ills of contemporary
human society, but rather a terrifying, vast, uninhabited space, imbued with raw power and the
angry wrath of god (Cronon 1995). As Cronon points out, this imagery soon gave way in the 18th
century to literary romanticism and ideas of nature as a sublime entity (Cronon 1995). Through
this view, in the eyes of society’s intellectual elite, conceptions of the “natural world” shifted
from a harsh wilderness unfit for human existence, to a pristine place with the capacity to elicit
spiritual responses through beauty which was impossible to find in the built environment
(Cronon 1995). In describing this shift, Cronon says,
The wastelands that had once seemed worthless had for some people come to seem
almost beyond price. That Thoreau in 1862 could declare wildness to be the preservation
of the world suggests the sea change that was going on. Wilderness had once been the
antithesis of all that was orderly and good—it had been the darkness, one might say, on
the far side of the garden wall—and yet now it was frequently likened to Eden itself
(Ibid., 72).
Following the Romantic movement, and with the incorporation of American “frontier” nostalgia
and subsequent desire to remove oneself from ills of an industrialized life, the American
preservationist movement began, and with it the removal of native Americans’ communities
from large swaths of land deemed to be too pristine for human use (Cronon 1995). While ideas
of wilderness have evolved over the subsequent decades, contemporary notions still stem from
19th century ideas and social movements, and were maintained through the American National
Park system and preservationist tradition, thus yielding much of the conceptual “natural” world
we see today (Cronon 1995). From this point on in this thesis, following scholars such as
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Cronon, I will now refer to this idealistic conceptualization of the natural as “nature” with a
capital “N”.
This is, of course, a summarized version of a complex reality, and is only an introduction
to the vast scholarly theorizations about what “Nature” means, both today and in the past. Yet,
this background is enough to begin to explain the transient form of the “natural world”, not as a
concrete object, but rather as a constructed entity. Today, much of Cronon’s original analysis is
still relevant to the tumultuous process that is nature-society relations. Aside from its origins
however, defining nature and navigating the human role in relation to it is still a continuously
evolving scholarly process due to our constantly evolving way of life. In his discussion of the
quest to define nature, Escobar quotes Bender to state that “people’s experience of nature and
landscapes ‘is based in large measure on the particularity of the social, political, and economic
relations within which they live out their lives” (Bender 1993 in Escobar 1999). In the next
section then, I propose to take a brief survey of the evolving ways in which “Nature” has been
theorized, while also pointing to alternative visions of the “Nature” that Cronon describes.

The Path of Constructivism: Theorizing Nature
Perhaps the best way to continue this discussion is through Arturo Escobar’s point that
suggesting Nature is a socially constructed concept is not the same as saying that there “is no
nature out there” (Escobar 2004). In other words, I don’t move to deny that there is no “nature”
which exists, rather I seek to critically evaluate the concept of an “ideal nature”, or going back to
Cronon’s analysis, “nature” with a capital “N”. Escobar, drawing from Soper, defines what I
label an “ideal Nature” as an “essential Nature”, or “nature as an essential principle and
foundational category, a ground for both being and society, nature as ‘an independent domain of
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intrinsic value, truth, or authenticity’” (Soper 1996 in Escobar 1999). This essential Nature then,
has come to be deconstructed in a number of different ways, as we move away from what
Escobar calls the “modern ideology of naturalism” (1996).
Critical scholars, in relation to Cronon’s work, have theorized a number of different ways
to deconstruct ideas of Nature, with some success (See Castree and Braun 2001, Neumann
1998). Notions of pristine wilderness as they relate to conservation have now come to be seen as
colonial export, a means of neoliberal accumulation, and a by-product of late stage capitalism
(See Smith 1984, Castree 2001, Buscher 2015, Brockington 2006). In the past few decades, one
of the most significant analyses of Nature have come from geographer Neil Smith, who in his
work Uneven Development, pointed to Nature as an entity produced by processes of global
capitalism (1984).
This idea, of Nature as a by-product of capital accumulation is one worth exploring, as it
leads to further reconceptualizations of the topic. In Uneven Development, Smith explores the
ways in which capitalism has produced global inequality, but also produced the spaces in which
global inequality exists (1984). One of these spaces, Smith states, is the realm of Nature.
Prudham points out, that at the most basic level, Smith’s thesis is that Nature is socially
produced. More specifically however, Smith argues that Nature is a literal material “artefact” of
late capitalism (Prudham 2009). This statement, makes up what has come to be known in
geography as “the production of nature”.
Smith’s argument points to the myriad of ways in which biophysical processes of
capitalism, such as pollution, genetic modification, and agriculture, have transformed the
material world, thus creating new ideas of what is Nature and what is not (Prudham 2009). In
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discussing aspects of the natural world that are arguably untouched by human influence, Smith
states,
But there is a more stringent case where, indeed, even the form of natural substance has
not previously been altered by human activity. Substantial parts of the geological
substratum would probably count here, if one went deep enough. So too would the solar
system if one went far enough, that is beyond the moon and beyond some of the planets
and beyond the assorted debris that has been jettisoned in space. But these rather extreme
examples hardly testify to the falsity of the “production of nature” thesis, especially when
one looks at more down-to-earth examples of supposedly unproduced nature, such as
Yellowstone Park or Yosemite. These are produced environments in every conceivable
sense. From the management of wildlife to the alteration of the landscape by human
occupancy, the material environment bears the stamp of human labor; from the beauty
salons to the restaurants, and from the camper parks to the Yogi Bear postcards,
Yosemite and Yellowstone are neatly packaged cultural experiences of environment on
which substantial profits are recorded each year. The point here is not nostalgia for a preproduced nature, whatever that might look like, but rather to demonstrate the extent to
which nature has in fact been altered through human agency. Where nature does survive
pristine, miles below the surface of the earth, or light years beyond it, it does so only
because as yet it is inaccessible. If we must, we can let this inaccessible nature support
our notions of nature as Edenic, but this is always an ideal, abstract nature of the
imagination, one that we will never know in reality. Human beings have produced
whatever nature became accessible to them (1984, 81).
In order to distinguish the “production of nature” from an inclusion of all anthropogenic change
(which has been happening since the advent of the first agricultural practices), Smith argues that
contemporary capitalism allows society to alter the world in a way that is unprecedented in
human history (Prudham 2009).3 This alteration, Smith argues, is distinctly global in nature.
Global processes of capital exchange and accumulation allow for new scales of production that
transform resources on a spatial level not possible outside systems of capitalist expansion
(Prudham 2009).
Furthermore, Smith argues that capitalism does not just physically produce Nature, but
also transforms the way in which we think about the Natural (Prudham 2009). In this way,
3

Here, I make brief reference to the idea of the “Anthropocene”, or a global era dominated by human
alteration of the “natural” environment. While not directly relevant now, the idea of the Anthropocene comes
up again towards the end of my analysis.
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commodification and the circulation of material through global markets has a significant impact
on the human conceptualization of what is purely Natural, and what is human. Prudham, in his
analysis of Smith’s work states,
Smith’s argument is that such an instrumentalist disposition specifically towards nature is
reinforced by capitalist social relations and processes of valuation, and that these ideas
become increasingly influential in the construction of meaning around nature in a
capitalist society. Examples would include instrumental, utilitarian arguments for
biodiversity conservation, which tend to both render species in terms of net present value
of future benefits, while also individuating such species in relation to their ecological
(and social!) context (2009,1).
While Smith’s work has retained a relatively prominent position amongst critical geographers,
some scholars have argued that a purely productionist oriented outlook ignores the ontological
influences of the non-human world (Castree 1995). In other words, what the production of nature
theory misses, is a recognition that non-human entities may have a profound impact on the ways
in which we view the world, and the ways in which we exist in the world. Castree too, argues
that too much of an emphasis upon human capitalistic production may in fact undermine the
“productive capacities” of the biophysical world, in regards to life systems (Prudham 2009). This
is not to say that Smith’s thesis is untrue, yet it points to an important weakness in doing away
with Nature completely.
Criticisms of the “production of nature” thesis point to the fact that moving to an entirely
“post-natural” standpoint has its shortcomings when it comes to recognizing the biophysical and
ontological influences of non-human beings and ecosystems. In his essay “After Nature”,
Escobar emphasizes this theoretical balance, writing:
It is necessary to strive for a more balanced position that acknowledges both the
constructedness of nature in human contexts- the fact that much of what ecologists refer
to as natural is indeed also a product of culture- and nature in the realest sense, that is, the
existence of an independent order of nature, including a biological body, the
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representations of which constructivists can legitimately query in terms of their history or
political implications.
Thus, holding on entirely to the production of nature theory, and viewing capital “N” nature as
an entity that was entirely produced by economic circumstance and human intervention seems to
leave society at an intellectual cliffhanger of sorts. As an alternative therefore, scholars such as
Escobar (1999) and Collard et al (2015), have proposed that viewing Nature as an economic
product of the colonial/capitalist project can be combined with efforts to re-evaluate and
restructure the term itself. In this way, as Escobar says, we can “navigate between ‘natureendorsing’ and ‘nature-skeptical’ perspectives in order to ‘incorporate a greater awareness of
what their respective discourses of ‘nature’ may be ignoring and politically repressing (Escobar
1999, 4; Soper 1996, 23). Theoretically, accepting Nature as a capitalist invention of the past,
and acknowledging the ruins it has left in its wake is a worthwhile endeavor, especially when
paired with attempts to find a new meaning of the term, and revise its dualistic nature (Collard et.
al 2015).
As previously stated, my aim in this thesis is to critically evaluate the discursive
production of Nature as it relates to western media coverage of Virunga National Park. At times
I also hint at potential solutions to the oppressive, essentialist Nature model, providing a baseline
for imagining more productive socio-ecological futures. While many scholars have put forth
ideas of how to “do away with” nature society dualism, Escobar (1999) and Whatmore (2001)
put forth two particularly compelling, and interrelated, theorizations of a “new” nature. In the
simplest of terms, new scholarly definitions of the natural, or the ones which I cite in this thesis,
revolve around Escobar’s central question in “After Nature”. He asks, “Is there a view of nature
that goes beyond the truism that nature is constructed to theorize the manifold forms in which it
is culturally constructed and socially produced, while fully acknowledging the biophysical basis
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of its constitution?” (1999, 3). He, and other nature-society scholars, would argue there is a
possible new way of viewing nature, starting with Whatmore’s conceptualization of “hybrid
natures”.
Hybridity, at its most basic level, refers to two ideas which manage to transgress some
type of established binary; a form of conceptual mixing (Whatmore 2009). Whatmore viewed
one of the main problems with the “production of nature” idea as the fact that even after
deconstructing “Nature”, the dualism remained, then leaving the world with a strange mix of
capitalist ruination and natural systems, and no real way to reconcile the two besides Cronon’s
ideas of valuing all natural systems as if they were on the same plane as the pristine wilderness
left behind. (Castree 2010). The true value of Whatmore’s “hybrid natures” therefore, if that it
allows for an acknowledgement of the damage Nature with a capital N has done, but then seeks
to completely re-envision human and natural systems relationships, with an emphasis on the
world as a place that has always been messy and confusing (Castree 2010).
Whatmore suggests that the ideas that Nature relied on during its foundation, don’t
actually exist (Castree 2010). Rather, she argues that there is no ontological divide between
natural and non-natural things, nor are there any qualities that make “nature” separate from
human society (Castree 2010). In this way, hybridity seeks to deterritorialize the “creatures and
spaces” that fall under the historical category of “wild” (Whatmore 2002, 12). Following
Whatmore, I problematize existing discourses of a traditional “wild” in effort to develop a more
inclusive understanding of human-nonhuman networks.
Escobar though, takes this analysis of hybridity a step further, suggesting then, that the
various “hybrids” which form our world, can be categorized into “regimes of nature” in order to
“facilitate the task of visualizing the span of articulations of the biological and historical” (1999,

15
4). He suggests, that concept of “social nature”, that is, nature which is produced via social
experience and processes, can be theorized as three overlapping entities: capitalist nature, nature,
and techno-nature (1999, 5). He maintains that,
the nature regimes can be seen as constituting a structured social totality made up of
multiple and irreducible relations, without a center or origin, that is, a field of
articulations...The identity of each regime is the result of discursive articulations- with
biological, social, and cultural coupling- that take place in an overall field of discursivity
wider than any particular regime (Escobar 1999).
These articulations co-produce each other, and are inherently relational. Escobar’s point
therefore, is to decentralize the human-nature, subject-object dualism in favor of a more
unsettled conceptualization of the processes responsible for the construction of “the natural”,
whether they be cultural, biophysical, or historical. In this thesis, as I will discuss, the nature that
I point to as being discursively produced tends to fall under Escobar’s classification of “capitalist
nature”, a nature which is “uniform, legible, manageable, harvestable, Fordist” (1999, 5). The
significance of this classification arises via his emphasis on the fact that what matters about these
regimes is “examining their mutual articulations and contradictions- the ways in which they vie
for the control of the social and biological” (1999, 5).
Through this thesis, therefore, I seek to investigate the ways through which capitalist
natures produced via discursive processes in Virunga potentially overpower other ideas of socioecological relationships, such as the “organic” regime that Escobar identifies. Later in the thesis I
will articulate further how other socio-ecological ideas might emerge once we critically evaluate
the discursive processes present in the park. First it is necessary to engage in that critical
discourse analysis in order to reveal other possibilities. Western discourse coming out of
Virunga National Park in the DRC reinforces the normative nature-society dualism when
consumed by society. This is, I argue, both to the detriment of humans, and nonhuman actors in
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the park, actively preventing possibilities of developing more equitable socioecological
coexistence.
The Political Ecology Approach
Much of the contemporary work of defining nature has been undertaken by scholars of
human geography, or more specifically the multi-disciplinary approach known as political
ecology. Far from a highly structured discipline, political ecology, since its relatively recent
emergence in the 1980’s, has continuously managed to defy concise definition (Watts 2009). The
political ecology approach is one that seeks to critically address environmental problems by
examining environmental degradation in the view of social, historical, cultural, and economic
contexts. Therefore, for the most part, those in the field of political ecology set out to show that
environmental problems are both political and ecological simultaneously (Valdivia 2011). To
perhaps put it most concisely, the approach seeks to investigate the “complex metabolism
between nature and society” (Watts 2009).Geographer Gabriela Valdivia outlines the main
themes of inquiry which have come to dominate the field, including political analysis, historical
analysis, ethnographic analysis, discourse analysis, and analysis of ecological field studies
(2011). Researchers who employ political ecology themes typically seek to understand how
different cultural phenomenon come together to interact with, and produce environmental
problems (Valdivia 2011).
I believe that bringing forward the brief but significant history of the political ecology
approach may help in clarifying its current goals. While some scholars argue that the general
concepts behind political ecology are evident in colonial criticisms from the early 19th century
(see Davidsen 2010), post-modern political ecology re-emerged in the 1970’s-1980’s with a
number of foundational scholarly pieces. As Valdivia states, critiques directed towards the
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shortcomings of the cultural ecology movement and mainstream development projects drove
forward a more environmentally centered critical approach to hazard and disasters (Validivia
2011). At this time, other scholars also sought to incorporate political economy, Marxism, and
colonial critiques into what many saw as Malthusian dominated environmental management
disciplines (Valdivia 2011). The result was that critical scholars coming from multiple different
fields were arriving at the same conclusions about dominant environmental paradigms, thus
fostering the desire for an interdisciplinary approach. What many political ecologists pinpoint as
the quasi-official start of the approach however is geographer Piers Blaikie’s cornerstone work
on soil erosion, titled “Land Degradation and Society (Watts 2009) (See Blaikie and Brookfield
1987). While attempting to understand dramatic soil depletion in a rural Nepalese community,
Blaikie eventually posited that the erosion was not due to environmental mismanagement, but
rather external conditions that forced residents to act in a certain manner, and created
unchangeable economic conditions. Deeply entrenched in a Marxian inspired view of political
economy, Blaikie’s study was the first to synthesize and consolidate the ideals of political
ecology into a somewhat cohesive body of work (Validvia 2011).
In a similar vein, I also seek to employ a multi-disciplinary approach to understand an
environmental problem, biodiversity conservation, through a specific case study, Virunga
National Park. Through a political ecology lens, it becomes quickly obvious that Virunga’s loss
of biodiversity is not simply a problem of environmental mismanagement, although it may
appear that way via various popular media representations. I, therefore, specifically utilize a
political ecology based discourse analysis in order to evaluate conservation within Virunga
through a critical lens, and to challenge popular media narratives of environmental degradation.
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Discourse, Power, and Method of Analysis
In this way, in the case of Virunga, the “discourse analysis” aspect of the political ecology
approach becomes critically important. I employ political and historical analysis to provide a
solid theoretical foundation to the object of Virunga. Yet, many of the questions I seek to
answer, revolve around how ideas of nature, specific to Virunga, are discursively constructed;
thus requiring a specific emphasis on the importance of discourse analysis to my approach.
Valdivia provides a clear definition of how discourse analysis fits into the framework of political
ecology approaches:
Discourse analyses...explore and aim to make visible the ways in which “the
environment” and “environmental problems” are discursively constructed. These
analyses emphasize a critical perspective towards modernist notions of objectivity and
rationality. They interrogate the relationship between power and scientific knowledge and
recognize the existence of multiple, culturally constructed ideas of the environment and
environmental problems (2011, 3).
Discourse analysis therefore, can be employed in order to understand how ideas of nature are
constructed at different multi-scalar levels, in direct contradiction to the notion that ideas of the
environment represent independently existent realities of the natural world.
In regards to social construction of the natural world, the importance of discourse cannot
be over-emphasized. In a very literal sense, discourse can be seen simply as the linguistic action
of conversing about a specific topic or subject. In the post-structuralist critical tradition however,
discourse occupies an extremely important space within the production of material realities
(Escobar 1996).
Originating out of Foucault’s approach to language and power, in a theoretical sense
discourse can be seen as a “system of representation” (Hall 2001). As opposed to simply a
linguistic context, Hall points to Foucault’s intention to portray discourse as a combination of
statements and practice with the ability to create meaning (Hall 2001). Hall states,
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Discourse, Foucault argues, constructs the topic. It defines and produces the subjects of
our knowledge. It governs the way that a topic can be meaningfully talked about and
reasoned about. It also influences how ideas are put into practice and used to regulate the
conduct of others (133).
Discourse and the system associated with are not just linguistic practices then, but a series of
individual ideas, actions, and statements which, when referring to the same subject, come
together to create a “discursive formation” (Hall 2001). Therefore, because of its role in
constructing how a topic can be talked about, this discursive formation also retains the ability to
define how a subject cannot be talked about; thus limiting the possibilities for imagining, acting,
and speaking in relation to the topic (Hall 2001). In other words, the discourse on a subject,
because it creates the subject effectively limits the practice of the subject (Hall 2001).
Foucault’s intention however, in pointing out discourse’s ability to limit construction of
lived reality, is also to suggest that meaning in material reality does not exist without discourse
(Hall 2001). Thus, in post-structuralism, discourse is the articulation of what is seen as “material
reality” to lived social reality (Escobar 2011). This is not to say that a “material reality” does not
exist; on the contrary Foucault does acknowledge the existence of real “things” outside of
discourse; but in his constructionist theory of meaning and representation discourse is what
ultimately imbues meaning onto the material world. With regards to the aspects of discourse
around an object, “They do not define its internal constitution, but what enables it to appear, to
juxtapose itself with other objects, to situate itself in relation to them, to define its difference, its
irreducibility, and even perhaps its heterogeneity, in short, to be placed in a field of exteriority”
(Foucault 1972, 60). Thus, as with most of the Marxist post-structuralist tradition, Foucault states
that discourse is able to articulate the meaning in an external field of an existing material reality,
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despite its inability, as with language, to demonstrate the essence of the existing object (Hall
2001).
Returning to discourse and Nature, understanding the discursive construction of the
natural world is imperative to understanding the social significance of the subject, and its
material existence within the “external field”, or society. As political ecologist Arturo Escobar
states, “discourse is the process through which social reality inevitably comes into being”, thus
rendering the discourse surrounding the natural world critical to understand its social
significance and relations (Escobar 2011).
In this sense, the discourse surrounding Virunga National Park can be seen as belonging
to the larger discursive formation of biodiversity conservation. Thus, a discourse analysis of the
specific place is able to inform the larger societal context of the formation as a whole. I therefore
seek to analyze various different examples of discourse related to conservation in Virunga
National Park.

Discursive (and other) Methodologies
Like all undertakings in the social sciences, critical discourse analysis (CDA) has an
associated methodology. It is important to note, as Wodak and Chilton argue, that CDA is
implemented differently across academic disciplines, and is better viewed as an approach, as
opposed to a definitive set of methodological practices. As Van Dijk notes though, most CDA is
united by a set of common goals including aims such as being problem oriented, paying attention
not just to verbal/written discourse but also to “other semiotic dimensions of communicative
events” (picture, film, music), and paying specific attention to societal power dynamics (1994,
18). Van Dijk also states that,
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Among the descriptive, explanatory and practical aims of CDA-studies is to uncover,
reveal, or disclose, what is implicit, hidden, or not immediately obvious in relations of
discursively enacted dominance or their underlying ideologies. That is, CDA specifically
focuses on the strategies of manipulation, legitimation, and the manufacture of consent
and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in
the interests of the powerful (1994, 18).
In accordance with the principles of CDA, I undertake my analysis of westernized discourse in
Virunga with the aim of uncovering the implicit transference of ideas of capital “N” nature. To
do this, I spent this past academic year researching and collecting discursive material relating to
the park, retrieving content from English-language based sources.1 This material includes entities
such as news reports, images, facebook posts, tweets, web pages, travel reviews, etc. Once
collected, the material was uploaded to my Zotero database for further analysis. To conduct a
more detailed CDA on social media perceptions of political processes in the park, I undertook a
full content analysis of a set of tweets about the park. In order to collect these tweets, I used a
pre-programmed Google Sheet which collected all of the tweets which were
hashtagged“(#)Virunga”, from the period of November 1st 2017 to March 1st 2018.2 Then I
imported the entire set into Nvivo - a qualitative data analysis software - and performed different
analyses which are detailed in Chapter 3.
In accordance with the interdisciplinary principles of political ecology, I have
supplemented my CDA with archival research about the park. At times, I also draw from my
experience with similar forms of conservation during my time spent on a political ecology
semester-long program in Tanzania in 2017.

Imagining Possible Discourses
As I stated previously, it is important to note that this particular discourse analysis is only
part of the story of Virunga Park. This thesis is the first half of what ideally should be a multi-
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part analysis. The discursive material that I have chosen to examine is easily accessed by western
citizens of the global north. Thus, this analysis aims to understand how western ideas of nature
are discursively constructed in relation to the Park. In thinking about Virunga, there are a myriad
of discourses which are produced that I am not able to access. For example, I have neither the
language skills nor the resources to access more localized discourses that may emerge from
Congolese communities in close proximity to the park. I am not fully able to incorporate
statements made by Congolese government agencies about the park. Significantly, I also fail to
address discourses which potentially emerge from Congolese park ranger communities, or proconservation organizations within the DRC.
As with all academic research, oftentimes resources, time, and skill sets become limiting
factors. As an undergraduate student, I have neither the timeframe nor assets to conduct longterm fieldwork in the Virunga area to access these discourses. Nor, am I able to access discursive
materials such as media, advertisements, or conversations which may exist that are not in
English. I am however, able to apply my skill set as a researcher in order to better understand
western conservation discourse about the park and the potential consequences that discourse may
have in its relation to constructing ideals of nature. What is helpful in this, is that as a white
American woman, I am in fact a consumer of mainstream western discourses. Thus, I focus on
analyzing discursive material that comes from sources that I, and others like me, interact with on
a daily basis.
Western ideas of nature as they appear in biodiversity conservation practice represent one
part of the cultural hegemony that western constructs of “wilderness” retain in contemporary
society. Mainstream ideals of a constructed natural world wield enormous power on the global
stage, and are inscribed into the mechanisms of various institutions, governments, and
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knowledge paradigms. In a Foucauldian sense therefore, understanding the discourses of western
constructs of nature within conservation is crucial to understanding how those ideas may wield
power. And, as will be discussed, the power that these ideas hold may very well have a myriad of
consequences for global biodiversity as a whole.
Returning to political ecology, the approach aims to understand environmental problems
and phenomenon through a variety of different lenses, only one of which is discursive.
Therefore, in order to truly understand the ways in which nature exists in relation to Virunga, an
ethnographic and alternative discursive methodology would be ideal in order to incorporate the
voices of people who live in and near the park. The world is a complex, and oftentimes messy,
place and discursive constructions as they relate to mainstream society likely do not tell the
whole story. Ethnography, as evidenced by the work of scholars over the past decade, is a critical
component of political ecology research. Ethnographic approaches allow for an authentic, and
potentially de-colonial approach to environmental problems, while at the same time elevating
subaltern voices (See Igoe 2004, Choy 2011, Hathaway 2013). I therefore seek, in the following
chapters to incorporate ethnographic work that others have done to create a more robust style of
analysis.

Understanding the Discursive Implications of Virunga National Park
Conservation, and conservation discourse ties directly into Whatmore’s ideas of
hybridity, as it has the ability to form theoretical natures which run directly counter to
deconstructing dualistic ideas of the natural. In regards to biodiversity conservation discourse
based on preserving Nature with a capital “N” she states, “such discourses, Cronon argues, get us
back to the wrong nature (1995), in the sense that they reproduce categorical binaries between
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society and nature, human and animal, domesticated and wild that are intellectually and
politically moribund” (Whatmore 2002). In keeping with the heart of this statement, I intend to
demonstrate that ways in which discourse surrounding specific aspects of Virunga enforce the
type of binaries that Whatmore points to, thus pointing to their culpability in enforcing a type of
wilderness protection that allows for no way forward if the world is to value all types of
biodiversity in the face of environmental crisis, and develop more effective means of dealing
with species decline.
Additionally, however, I believe that this discourse does in fact, hold consequences for
the biodiversity, human and non-human, residing in the area of Virunga National Park. While
understanding just what these consequences may be, is perhaps the work of ethnographic
inquiry, it’s easy to see how drawing binaries can lead to exclusionary resource politics,
militarization, and a devaluation of human life in relation to wilderness areas. As I will show,
Virunga National Park as an entity, is perhaps the epitome of Whatmore’s “hybrid”. The park is
a messy conglomeration of human residency, megafauna, armed warfare, colonialism,
uninhabited space, and valuable “natural” resources amongst many other beings and processes.
Yet, it is also a place teeming with life, holding the title for “most biodiverse” area on earth. Not
recognizing the park, the land, and the region, as the subject of human and non-human coproduction does an injustice to all life in the area, and allows for the same blind dualism to be
applied to other conservation areas, with the same consequences. As Foucault notes, discourse
has the potential to determine the possible ways to imagine material realities. So, through
problematizing the discourses I’ve found, I hope to expand the possibilities for imagining a
different reality of conservation within Virunga National Park.
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In the next two chapters, before directly addressing the discursive material that I have
collected, I will undertake a historical analysis of conservation in the DRC, highlighting the
processes of colonialism and late capitalism. I will also specifically discuss the formation of
Virunga Park, and the current state of the park, thus setting the stage for a critical analysis of
contemporary social and political processes within the park.

1

I chose to use English because discursive material published in English is frequently consumed by western
citizens. Also, while I have actively pursued French at Bucknell and am partially proficient in Kiswahili thanks
to my time spent in Tanzania, I am not at the point where I would feel comfortable interpreting materials for
scholarly analysis.
2
The word “Virunga” refers to nothing else besides the park. It is a deviation of the Kinyarwanda word for
“volcanoes”. I was therefore not concerned about getting hashtags which were not about the park.
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Chapter II: Colonial Roots: Virunga as Imperial Artifact
In the following two chapters, before engaging with different contemporary social and
political processes in Virunga, I will first contextualize Virunga National Park within larger
histories of the Democratic Republic of Congo and colonial land use on the African Continent.
This chapter specifically will focus (briefly) on pre-colonial environmental histories, the rise of
European colonialism and subsequent imposition of western conservation models, and resource
use in the era of Independence. In this way, I seek to weave the narrative of Virunga into a larger
body of historical context, situating it not as a singular national entity, but rather as a product of
imperialist forces. To chronicle these various historical processes, I draw from the work of a
number of Central African scholars and historians, including but not limited to Giles-Vernick
(2002), Hunt (1999) Gondola (2002), Hochschild (1999), and Nzongola-Ntalaja (2001). Prior to
this historical analysis, I provide an ecological and physical overview of the park in order to give
the reader a spatial reference for the area being discussed.

Spatial and Physical Characteristics
Currently, Virunga occupies 7,800 km2 in the northeastern Democratic Republic of
Congo. The Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) is located directly in the center of the African
continent, and spans from the west African coast, just south of the Republic of Congo, to its most
eastern point at the border of Uganda and Rwanda (See Map Appendix 1). Of the 2,344,858
square miles that make up the DRC’s surface area, roughly 12.1% are protected “terrestrial
areas” (Global Forest Atlas 2018). Additionally, according to the WWF, the DRC is home to
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over 50% of the landmass of Africa’s tropical forests, as it is by far the largest semi-tropical
nation on the continent (WWF 2018).
In conjunction with its vast mass of forest land, the DRC is, according to environmental
governance agencies, “the most biologically diverse country in Africa, and one of the most
important centers of biodiversity in the world” (WWF 2018). It is likely home to over 15,000
species, a fifth of which are endemic, or only found in that particular region (WWF 2018).
Because of the imposition of imperial ideas of wilderness, along with this status of much of the
Congo as a “biodiversity hotspot”, a vast number of western model based reserves, parks, and
protected areas have been created in the country over the past century (See Map Appendix 2).
Virunga is one of the many protected wilderness areas within the Congo. While not the
largest (Salonga Forest Reserve retains this spot at 36,000 km2), it is both the oldest and perhaps
the most well-known. Situated in the “great lakes region” of East Africa, Virunga is tucked into
the Eastern Congo, in an area known as the Kivus (See Map Appendix 3). Spanning the entire
length of the North Kivu province, the park touches the boundary of South Kivu, just north of the
eastern capital city of Goma (See Map Appendix 4). As I noted previously, Virunga operates as a
type of geographical nexus, as it is flanked by Uganda to the Northeast, Rwanda and Lake Kivu
to the Southeast, and is dissected almost in half by Lake Edward (See Map Appendix 5).
Additionally, on the Rwandan border in the Southern sector, Virunga National Park continues
directly into Volcanoes National Park.1 The park area itself is also flanked by a number of other
protected areas, bumping its total “landscape” area to over 15,155 km2 (Kenfack 2013).

1

Volcanoes National Park is administered as a separate entity from Virunga National Park, and is located on
the Rwandan side of the Virunga Landscape. While it is technically part of the physical landscape, I spend
very little time discussing it because politically, socially, and economically it is a very different entity than
Virunga.
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In an ecological sense, the Virunga landscape is diverse, vast, and exceedingly complex.
As a whole, the ecosystem is part of the general area known as the East African Rift Valley, a
divergent plate boundary which has produced much of East Africa’s mountains, lake valleys, and
volcanism. The park is made up of three ecosystem regions: pine barrens, mountainous forests,
and forest/savannah conglomerates (Kenfack 2013). It is also home to a number of aquatic
ecosystems, including the majority of Lake Edward (Kenfack 2013).
In addition to landscapes such as forests, savannahs, and barrens, Virunga also has a large
topographic diversity. It is home to three mountain ranges: the Mitumba, Rwenzori, and Virunga.
The Virunga range, located in the south of the park is comprised of regularly active volcanoes,
the most well-known of which is Mt. Nyiragongo (VNP 2018) (See Appendix 7). While clearly
an environmental hazard for those living in the vicinity, this volcanism helps to explain both the
diversity of Virunga’s landscape and the extremely fertile volcanic soils (VNP 2018). In stark
contrast to the Virunga Range, the Rwenzori mountains in the northern park sector contain a
number of glaciers amongst their peaks, on the border of Uganda (Kenfack 2013).
Aside from the physical environment, the park encompasses a wide variety of nonhuman
residents. A number of large and well-known species inhabit the park, including 22 different
species of primates, 3 of which are classified as “great apes”. These residents include mountain
gorillas, eastern lowland gorillas, and eastern chimpanzees (Kenfack 2013). Another large
mammal of the park that receives a fair amount of attention is the critically endangered Okapi, a
deer-like relative of the giraffe (Kenfack 2013). It is also important to recognize that the park
hosts approximately 706 species of birds, 109 species of reptiles, and 78 species of amphibians.
The park landscape supports a multitude of human communities where people rely on
small scale subsistence agriculture and fishing (Kenfack 2013). According to a number of
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sources, the Virunga area is actually one of the most densely populated areas of the DRC, with
300 human inhabitants per km2 (Marijnen and Verweijen 2018). Many of these communities are
located outside of the official park in the city of Goma, or in smaller towns such as Rutshuru
(VNP 2018). There however, a number of “permitted” human settlements along the shores of
Lake Edward within the official boundaries of the park (VNP 2018). These villages are subject to
park regulations and their livelihood practices (mainly fishing) are restricted Marijnen and
Verweijen 2018) Understanding humans and human impact as part of the Virunga ecosystem is
therefore crucially important. Therefore, In the subsequent sections I will place a significant
emphasis on understanding the human history of Virunga, and the role of (and consequences for)
people in the park.

Pre-Colonial Land Use and European Imperialism
The creation of Virunga National Park was a direct result of overarching patterns of
colonial resource exploitation and the imposition of Western imperial conservation practice
(Marinjen and Verweijen 2016). I will continue to elaborate upon the connection between
colonial land dispossession and contemporary conservation in the chapters to follow. For the
time being however, without delving too far into the theoretical underpinnings, I seek to outline
the basic political and colonial apparatuses constructed in the Congo region which led to
Virunga’s creation and maintenance over the past century, beginning with a brief discussion of
land use in the DRC prior to the colonial era.2
Prior to the impacts of European colonialism, the Congo Basin was largely inhabited by
Bantu-speaking people, who at some point arrived in the area from present day Nigeria (Gondola
2

I am by no means an expert on pre-colonial land-use histories of the Congo Basin. Additionally, much of this
research is beyond the scope of my thesis. For more information on the topic see the entirety of GilesVernick’s “Cutting the Vines of the Past” (2002) and Klieman’s “The Pygmies were our compass” (2003)
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2002).3 The arrival of the Bantu-speaking people pushed forest dwelling, non-Bantu speaking
populations (popularly known as the Central African Pygmy people) northward (Gondola 2002).
Additionally, nomadic cattle herding communities from East Africa traveled up the Nile River to
settle in the Great Lakes Region (Gondola 2002). While all of the Congo region was therefore a
culturally diverse area, the Northeast Congo, where Virunga would be created, was especially
diversified in a cultural and ethnic sense, and was (and is) home to many different types of
human communities (Gondola 2002).
These different communities brought with them different agricultural techniques and
ways of living. Gondola points out that in particular, Bantu-speaking peoples contributed heavily
to the development of intensive agricultural practices and the use of iron smelting (Gondola
2002). In regard to pre-colonial land-use practices, I place an emphasis on the Pygmy people of
the Great Lakes Region, known as the Batwa.4 The Batwa can be thought of as the primary
indigenous community in the present-day Virunga region (Lewis 2000). While Klieman does
dispute whether from an anthropological standpoint they can truly be considered as
autochthonous to the region, they are treated politically, and culturally, as a minority indigenous
group (Lewis 2000; Klieman 2003, xvii).
With regard to land use, the Batwa of the Great Lakes were (and still are) huntergatherers and forest dwellers. In particular, the Batwa of the Great Lakes Region did not practice
settler agriculture but rather relied on forest resources for subsistence, employing small scale
hunting, fishing, and craftsmanship (Lewis 2000). Like many indigenous communities across the
globe, pre-colonial Batwa society can be described as both sustainable with regard to resource
3

The “Congo Basin” different from the Democratic Republic of Congo in that it is an ecological term which
describes the sedimentary basin of the Congo River. This area stretched from the eastern border of the presentday DRC, to the Atlantic coast in West Africa.
4
With regard to naming, Lewis states that “Batwa” and “Bambuti” are used somewhat interchangeably in the
Kivu Region
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use and environmentally low-impact (Lewis 2000). The arrival of the Portuguese in 1482
however, brought about significant (and devastating) changes to the workings of human society
in the Congo Basin, including the Batwa. I will come back to the Batwa people of the Great
Lakes, but first, will begin to address the development of European colonialism in the Congo
Region.
As with most of sub-Saharan Africa, the nation now known as the DRC endured a period
of oppressive European colonialism ushered in by the era of exploration (Hochschild 1999). In
1482, ten years prior to when Columbus would accidently arrive in the Americas, the explorer
Diogo Cao of Portugal, on a journey towards the southern tip of Africa, stumbled upon the
mouth of the Congo River (Hochschild 1999). Following this “discovery”, Portuguese
missionaries began arriving in the territory in steady supply, bringing with them European goods,
Christianity, and much disruption to the Bantu speaking Kingdom of the Kongo, a bustling
sovereignty occupied by tens of thousands of people, which covered the three hundred square
miles adjacent to the river’s mouth (Hochschild 1999; Klieman 2003, 173). Within a decade
however, this interference developed into a full blown Atlantic slave trade, fueled by the
Portuguese arrival in Brazil in 1500 (Hochschild 1999). By the 1630’s it was estimated that
European slavers shipped 15,000 people a year from the mouth of the Congo to the Americas,
effectively destroyed the political and social infrastructure of the existing Kingdom (Hochschild
1999; Klieman 2003, 175). Klieman writes,
The devastation and tragedy wrought on central Africans by the Atlantic slave trade was
immense. Because this region served as a source of captives throughout the entirety of
the Atlantic slave trade, the demographic losses were exceedingly high. Current estimates
indicate that nearly 45%, roughly five million of the total eleven million Africans
imported to the Americas between 1519 and 1867, were embarked from central African
shores. Yet it was not simply the loss of loved ones or neighbors these peoples had to
cope with; warfare, dislocation, famine and the introduction of new diseases led to the
unprecedented loss of life among those who remained on the continent. These tragedies
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were accompanied by the transformation and/or destruction of the political, economic,
and religious systems that had sustained central African societies for centuries (Klieman
2003, 177).
As Congolese historian Nzongola-Ntalaja notes, the Atlantic slave trade continued to
dominate European-African relations through the 19th century, allowing for the acquired capital
accumulation to drive forward the industrial revolution (2002). Starting in the mid 1800’s
European countries began to export raw materials from the African coast to fuel industrial
processes back home (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). 5
In the summer of August 1877, journalist Henry Morton Stanley successfully completed
the first European cross-continental navigation of the African continent (Hochschild 1999).
Leaving violence and destruction in his wake, Stanley began in the Zanzibar archipelago, and
with the forced labor of hundreds of enslaved African porters, made his way along the Congo
River to the West Coast (Hochschild 1999). The importance of Stanley’s journey to colonial
Congolese history, however, is the fact that it captured the attention of King Leopold II, of
Belgium (Hochschild 1999). Leopold had long wanted his own personal colony and viewed
Stanley’s exploration as a starting point through which to acquire it (Hochschild 1999). Under
the guise of a charity organization called “The International Association of the Congo”, Leopold
commissioned Stanley to journey back into the interior of the Congo to establish trading posts,
and force chiefs into signing protectorate treaties (Gondola 2002). Unsurprisingly, these
“treaties” were not legitimate in any sense of the word. As Hochschild writes,
5

Interestingly enough, as Nzongola-Ntalaja points out, while European colonists wreaked havoc upon the
economies and people of coastal communities in the Congo area, the vast majority of the inland areas were
untouched. While the Congo River originally provided a marker to identify the Kongo Kingdom, it was also a
formidable obstacle into the inland of the region (Hochschild 2002). Portuguese missionaries and various
other European expeditions failed to clear the gorge, and consequent rapids, that lead to the inland part of the
River, thus sparing the rest of the Congo region, for the most part, from the perils of the colonial slave trade
until the arrival of Stanley (Hochschild 2002).
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The very word “treaty” is a euphemism, for many chiefs has no idea what they were
signing. Few had seen the written word before, and they were being asked to mark their
X’s to documents in a foreign language and in legalese. The idea of a treaty of friendship
between two clans or villages was familiar; the idea of signing over one’s land to
someone on the other side of the ocean was inconceivable (72).
The next part of the story will perhaps be more familiar to those with exposure to European
history. In November of 1884, German Chancellor Otto von Bismarck convened what has come
to be known as the “Berlin Conference” for the European powers to settle conflict over their
African colonies (Gondola 2002).6 In relation to the Congo however, unbeknownst to many of
the attendees of the conference, Leopold the II had preemptively ensured that his claim on the
Congo region would be recognized (Hochschild 1999). He did this mainly through clever
political maneuvering, strategically confusing foreign delegates, and using fake philanthropic
organizations as fronts (Hochschild 1999). Leopold II’s tactics worked, and in February 1885,
conference delegates signed The Berlin Act on Congo, recognizing Leopold’s title to what was
then known as the “International Association of the Congo”. Leopold quickly renamed his new
land-holding the Etat Independent du Congo, or, the Congo Free State, declaring himself the sole
“owner” for the next 26 years (Gondola 2002).
Colonial Rule in the Congo is split into two phases: King Leopold’s personal rule as
“king-sovereign” of the territory from 1885-1908, and Belgium’s formal acquisition of the
Colony which lasted from 1908 until independence in 1960 (Gondola 2002). Both eras were
marked by the looting of natural resources, extreme violence against local populations, and
occupation of the region by either Leopold’s “Force Publique” or Belgian authorities (Gondola
2002). One of Leopold’s first actions upon receiving international recognition to his claim on the
6

Popular narratives of the conference label it as the meeting where European leaders each took a “slice of the
African cake”. In actuality, it served as a meeting to establish the “rules” of colonial commerce on the
continent, and set in motion the infamous Scramble for Africa (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002).
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Congo Free state was to assert his reign over the vast interior of the Congo region (Gondala
2002). Leopold had covertly commissioned Stanley during his previous trip to the continent to
establish a railroad up past the treacherous rapids to allow for the possibility of transportation.
Once complete, this railroad allowed for steamboat parts to be brought up and assembled on the
banks of the calm stretch of river, creating the potential for a vast inland network of colonial
posts (Hochschild 1999). With this new infrastructure in place, Leopold and the colonial forces
quickly moved towards his ultimate goal: profit.7 As Nzongala-Ntalaja remarks,
As a good capitalist, the king had to judge the success of his colonial enterprise in strictly
business terms, that is, in terms of whether or not it was profitable. Given the low level of
development of productive forces in the Congo, the king and his agents, who included
quite a lot of Italians and Scandinavians, had to resort to primitive accumulation. This
meant the use of torture, murder, and other inhuman methods to compel the Congolese to
abandon their way of life to produce or do whatever the colonial state required of them
(2002, 20).
Nzongala-Ntalaja introduces an important point. While most European colonial regimes
employed some type of violent rule, and all operated on the basis of exploitation and cultural
oppression, Leopold’s Congo was a particularly horrific episode in African colonial history.
What was once a prosperous and culturally diverse region was quickly destroyed, and the people,
most of them previously residing in small networks of Bantu-speaking communities, were
enslaved (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). To make matters worse, many of these communities, some of
which had previously been large kingdoms, had already been weakened and fragmented by
Swahili slave raids from the East, thus making them particularly vulnerable to Leopold’s
conquest (Hochschild 1999).
7

Leopold II had spent a massive amount of money to make his dream of ruling a colony possible (NzongolaNtalaja 2002). Due to the fact that the government of Belgium did not “own the colony”, the royal family did,
Leopold had to borrow (and swindle) money to fund his endeavor from the Belgian government, willing
donors, and other miscellaneous sources (Hochschild 1999). Consequently, he was in debt, and needed to
quickly repay his loans, and make it appear that his new landholding was to the benefit of Belgium itself
(Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002)
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Leopold, while already taking advantage of the Congo’s resources, and employing forced
labor, soon saw an opportunity to generate the type of profit he desired (Hochschild 1999). In
1891, Edouard Michelin patented the rubber tire, thus creating a vast global market for raw
rubber, which the Congo region had much of in the form of Landolphia Owariensis, or the
Congo Rubber Plant (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In order to harvest the plant, Leopold’s forces
decided to enslave the local people to perform the laborious task of extracting the raw rubber. To
force them to do this they employed a wide range of torture and other violent methods such as
kidnapping of family members, whippings, and public executions, amongst other violent acts
(Hochschild 1999). During Leopold’s reign, archival documents demonstrate that the population
dropped by half due to killings, disease, starvation, and a plummeting birth rate (Hochschild
1999).8
While perhaps seemingly far removed from a National Park established in 1925, and the
conservation practice happening now, understanding what went on in Leopold’s Congo is crucial
for understanding the DRC and Virunga today. I will continue to emphasize colonial resource
exploitation and disruption of land usage later, yet just as Yosemite cannot be separated from the
forced removal of Native American populations, Virunga cannot be understood without the
violent colonial history that precedes it.
By the early 1900’s much of the world had caught on to the horrors of the regime, calling
for reform.9 Belgium, under intense international pressure because of its rogue king and his

8

I do not have the space nor the expertise to chronicle the details of Leopold’s reign. Scholars such as Gondola
(2002), Nzongola-Ntalaja (2002), Hochschild (1999), Hunt (1999, 2016) however, have fortunately chronicled
both the atrocities committed and the acts of resistance, such as armed uprisings and nationalist religious
movements made by local communities in response to such terror.
9
By the early 1900’s, a number of individuals had caught on to the horrors of the operation Leopold was
running, most famously a shipping clerk named Edmund D. Morel (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). In cooperation
with other witnesses to the atrocities of the colonial regime (missionaries, employees, merchants), Morel used
a combination of humanitarian appeals and prolific journalism to mobilize what is now commonly recognized
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personal colony, eventually forced Leopold to “hand over” authority of the Congo to the Belgian
Parliament (Nzongola-Ntalaja). Thus, in 1908 the “Congo Free State” became the Belgian Congo
(Nzongola-Ntalaja). This transition, however, was not a liberation of the Congo and the people
who inhabited the region. Rather, it was simply a transfer of power from one violent colonial
regime to a more discreetly violent colonial regime. Nzongola-Ntalaja makes a crucial point in
stating that the organization leading the charge against Leopold, the Congolese Reform
Association (CRA), was not directly opposed to colonialism, but rather advocated for a
humanitarian reform of the colonial movement:
the CRA did not represent a radical departure from humanitarianism as a social practice,
because Morel and his partners did not call into question the colonial and imperialist
bases of that system of exploitation. They were still dealing more with the symptoms of
the Congo problem, the atrocities and a particular form of colonial practice responsible
for them, rather than with its root causes, the subjection of a people’s entire social
process to foreign domination (2002, 26).
Furthermore, Gondola argues that the decision made by Belgium to annex the Congo
(commonly referred to as the “Belgium-Solution”) was not motivated by a desire to right
Leopold’s wrongs, nor even regain a positive international reputation (2002). As a relatively
poor fledgling nation in a precarious diplomatic position, members of the Belgian government
viewed annexation of the massive colony as a liability (Gondola 2002). What ultimately
convinced Belgian politicians to go through with the “Belgium-Solution” was the economic
promise that the Congo presented (Gondola 2002). As Leopold’s regime had already

as the world’s first human rights campaign under the name of “The Congo Reform Association” (CRA)
(Nzongola-Ntalaja). With the material circulated by the CRA available to the world, global public opinion
turned quickly against Leopold and his regime (Hochschild 1999). Hochschild notes, with some amusement:
“The crusade that E.D Morel now orchestrated through the Congo Reform Association exerted a relentless,
growing pressure on the Belgian, British, and American governments. Almost never has one man, possessed of
no wealth, title, or official post, caused so much trouble for the governments of several major countries”
(209).
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demonstrated with the exploitation of rubber and ivory, the Congo Basin was rich in minerals
and natural resources (Gondola 2002). (This status as a resource rich area would continue to
draw exploitative economic interest to the Congo Basin well past the official end of colonialism.)
Consequently, in 1908, Belgium had no intention of overhauling the colonial system. In this way,
the transition of colonial power from Leopold to the Belgian state represented no real change to
the oppression enacted upon the people of the Congo Basin, and in no way returned any type of
right to self-determination (2002, 15). Rather, the “state” administration of the colony simply
continued the larger patterns of abuse present in European colonialism.
The structure of the colonial regime remained largely the same under Belgian state
authority (Gondola 2002). The Belgian government intervened in the societal structures of
Congolese communities, and also upon the personal lives of the colonized people, enacting a
significant burden of cultural oppression (Gondola 2002). Gondola points out that while the
colony’s main function was, in the eyes of the Belgians, to generate profit, colonial authority was
also dominated by a “mission civilisatrice” (civilizing mission) (Gondola 2002). As Hunt notes
in her work on colonial maternal interventions, the people of the Congo basin became the
subjects for European missionary work, and the imposition of a re-education campaign that
sought to “westernize” the culture of the region, going so far as to regulate personal facets of life
such as reproductive practice (Hunt 1999).
Perhaps one of the most damaging structural changes enacted by Belgian authorities was
the establishment of “chiefdoms” (Gondola 2002). As I pointed to previously, colonialism
destroyed the political organization and infrastructure that had existed within the region, such as
the large communities like the Kingdom of the Kongo, and smaller community, such as the
Batwa. Looking for a way to govern “indirectly”, the Belgians, in 1908, started creating small
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political communities that became “chiefdoms”. By deposing any community leaders that who
disagreed with regime policies, Belgian authorities effectively bribed individuals into the
positions (Gondola 2009). Unfortunately, many of these appointed “chiefs” were then
automatically at odds with the local people as they were then paid to enforce colonial rulings and
supervise/recruit forced labor (Gondola 2009). Over time, this chiefdom system was expanded to
larger administrative units, as the Belgians found it hard to manage the 2,496 chiefdoms that they
had established originally. Regardless of size, the establishment of arbitrary administrative units
is a crucial piece of colonial legacy for the Congo, and other colonized African nations. As
Gondola points out, the Belgians assumed that communities in the Congo basin were organized
as small ethnic tribes, whereas in reality society in the pre-colonial Congo Basin was made up of
large political districts (2002, 79).10 Thus, the Belgian established administrative areas had
nothing to do with existing relationships or social orders. We need not look very far to
understand the imposition of arbitrary state boundaries on colonized nations and on
contemporary conflict in postcolonial countries. As with the Rwandan genocide, and political
unrest in post-colonial countries such as Algeria, imperial boundary drawing is a crucial piece to
understanding the proliferation of armed groups, and land use conflict in the Congo today.

Virunga and the Colonial, Capitalist Endangerment of Biodiversity
The advent of Belgian State colonialism in the Congo is an opportune time to transition
into a discussion of the founding of Virunga, and a larger analysis of the imposition of the
colonial conservation model. The concept of the “national park” is typically traced back to
Yellowstone National Park in the United States (Brockington et al 2008). As Brockington et.al
10

See Klieman (2003) for a thorough analysis of the structures of various different societies that existed in the
Congo Basin before colonialism
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point out, however, ideas of conservation of natural resources, whether for religious, nationalist,
recreational, or utilitarian reasons, existed far before the establishment of Yellowstone in 1830.
The history of conservation on the African continent too begins far before the 19th century, as
burial sites for some African communities “known as sacred groves” were left untouched to
flourish (Brockington et al 2008; Sheridan and Nyamweru 2008). Additionally, the Batwa people
of the Congo I mentioned previously, held a deep respect for the forest, considering it be a sacred
entity (Lewis 2003). Lewis writes,
For the Mbuti people of the Ituri forest of northeastern Democratic Republic of the
Congo, a nomadic hunter-gatherer society, the forest is sacred. It is the source of their
existence – their god, parent and sanctuary. The Mbuti are bamiki bandura, “children of
the forest”, enveloped from birth in a rich symbolic tradition that stresses the supreme
value of ndura, or “forestness”. Mbuti speak and sing reverently and lightheartedly about,
and to, the forest. They sing “leaf-carrying” and “honey-bee” songs. The most valued are
songs without words, sung to awaken the forest and make it rejoice through the beauty of
the sound alone. Dances performed for ritual purposes or for pure enjoyment include the
mimetic “elephant hunt” and “honey-bee” dances, enacted to attract, and give thanks for,
game and food (Lewis 1).
In this way, it is clear that in the Central African, and global context, conservation of
biodiversity and natural resources certainly did not begin in the United States.
Virunga National Park, however, emerges from a specific conservation tradition
embedded in more imperialist ideas of wilderness and resource usage. As Brockington et. al
point out, during the colonial era, sub-Saharan Africa had by far the most protected areas
established within its boundaries. Other colonized regions, such as southeast Asia, also too have
high numbers of established protected areas (Brockington et al 2008). This phenomenon
therefore, is closely tied to the dominant imperialist model of conservation, rooted in a desire to
hunt big game and to practice the taking of “natural history” (Brockington et al 2008). Dunn
notes,
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Paul Jepson and Robert J Whittaker (2002) have argued that the modern western
conservation ideology emerged because of changing views on the human-nature
relationship, which were rooted in Anglophile natural history and hunting traditions. The
study of natural history, though largely the privileged domain of the aristocracy, was
intimately tied to European exploration, expansion, and conquest. Hunting, also largely a
luxury of the elite, became tied to the practice of imperialism, particularly through the
rise of big game safaris (435).
However, with the rise of Darwinian ideology about human-induced extinction of species, Dunn
argues that the commonly held view of “nature” as a robust and resilient system began to
gradually give way to the notion of flora and fauna as fragile entities (Dunn 2009). Thus,
European hunters and natural historians began to undertake the mission of western conservation
models; natural historians being motivated by the desire to preserve species, and hunters being
motivated by the desire to preserve big game (Dunn 2009). Another layer to this colonial switch
though, is that through the creation of conserved “spaces”, colonial conservation ideology
quickly drew a clear line between the “human” and the “natural” (Dunn 2009). Dunn claims,
In creating national parks, the colonial state spoke of the need to preserve landscapes
unspoiled and untamed by man. Such a claim of course, often ignored a long tradition of
land use by the local populations, and posited a separation between humans and nature,
the latter being constantly at threat from the former (435).
Literal boundary drawing therefore became a type of figurative boundary drawing between what
was “society” and what was “nature”. Additionally, conservation and views around resource
usage also held consequences for the fate of the colonial project itself (Dunn 2009). With the
delineation between “human” and “natural” also came stipulations about the management of
“natural” spaces (Dunn 2009). Unsurprisingly, European imperialists deemed the African people
unfit for this task and by European imperialists, and therefore likely to “mismanage” flora and
fauna into extinction through this “uncivilized” cultural practices. In this way, the mission of
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conservation also became an overarching justification for the European colonial project, and a
mandate for colonial state intervention (Dunn 2009).
Virunga National Park came to fruition within this context of the imperial conservation
movement. Established in 1925, it was officially the first “National Park” on the African
continent (beating Kruger National Park by less than a year) (Van Schuylenbergh 2009). The
year 1925 can be described as perhaps the “peak” of the Belgian Congo, thus tying the state
colonial regime to the very foundation of the park and the fortress conservation model under
which it currently operates.
Many of the protected areas on the African continent were inspired by the hunting of
large game by European colonists. In the case of parks such as South Africa’s Kruger, or
Tanzania’s Serengeti, these animals tended to be species such as lions, elephants, rhinos,
leopards, etc. In the case of Virunga however, it was the Mountain Gorilla which quickly came
to be the star of the conservation movement (2009, 64). Van Schuylenbergh claims that after two
mountain gorillas were shot by a Captain in the East African Navy, a type of rivalry was started
amongst the imperial European nations to collect specimens and establish them within museums
back in Europe. Soon, conservationists began to voice concern about the extinction of the species
(Although it is important to note that this potential for extinction was likely driven by European
hunters as opposed to local people). Real momentum towards the establishment of a protected
area however, occurred with the arrival of Carl Akeley.
Akeley, a taxidermist by training, arrived in Kivu during the early 1920’s to collect a
gorilla specimen for the American Museum of Natural History (Van Schuylenbergh 2009).
According to Van Schuylenbergh, Akeley “returned to the United States with the conviction that
Mountain Gorillas in the area were rare, but as they were neither scared nor aggressive their
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extinction was imminent” (2009, 65). Apparently, Akeley then waged a lobbying campaign from
1922-1925 to establish a gorilla sanctuary between the “triangle formed by the three extinct
volcanoes: Mikeno, Karisimbi, and Visoke” (2009, 65). In a passage from the book chronicling
his expedition, Brightest Africa, Akeley writes,
This sanctuary would not interfere with any other activity in the country, the gorilla range
is not fit for agriculture, the natives use it now as a source for firewood and a grazing
ground for their cattle. It could continue to be put to as far as the gorillas would be
concerned. Elephants, buffaloes, and other animals so as to become something of a
problem, but their numbers could be kept down without disturbing the gorillas sense of
security (2015, 2)
After an extensive campaign and meeting with King Albert I of Belgium (Leopold’s
successor) Akeley was successful in accomplishing his goal. On April 21st, 1925 the protected
area was established by royal decree and named Albert National Park (Van Schuylenbergh
2009). At first, the park only encompassed the mountain gorilla habitat (between the three
mountains), as Akeley had defined (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016). Soon after however,
Belgium and colonial authorities decided to expand the park boundaries beyond the gorilla
habitat to encompass Lake Edward and other geographic features (See Van Schuylenbergh for a
specific description of this process). However, as Marijnen and Verweijen point out, the
expansion of the park coincided with an evacuation of the residents of the area by the colonial
government due to an outbreak of sleeping sickness (trypanosomiasis) (2016). Thus, the park
was expanded under the guise of a state of emergency, effectively dispossessing local residents
of their land without having obviously forced them off of the land. As Marijnen points out,
drawing from Congolese land use expert Nzabandora, most residents never received their land
back, nor were compensated for their loss.
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1.
Figure 1 Source: DiSilvestro via ArcGIS

2.
Figure 2 Source: DiSilvestro via ArcGIS
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3.
Figure 3 Source: ArcGIS

4.
Figure 4 Source: ArcGIS
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5.
Figure 5 Source: Virunga.org
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Chapter III: Landscapes of Conflict: Post-Colonial Virunga and the DRC Today

“To say it’s a trip of a lifetime is a little under rated. To hike in the mountains was great in itself,
then to see gorillas and get to spend an hour with them, is beyond compare. If you are in the
region and you love animals do this trek. They have porters who will carry you if you are unable
to walk. It’s amazing how fast they can walk carrying someone. There were two people in our
group who used this service. I hired a porter and he helped me in difficult spots. This is life
changing.”
(Trip Advisor Review, 2017)

In this chapter, I will build from my explanation of the history of the DRC and specific
history of Virunga National Park, with a particular emphasis on the park as a colonial relic. This
chapter encompasses the process of decolonization, the reign of Mobutu Sese Seko, and the First
and Second Congo wars, supplemented by an explanation of conservation in Virunga throughout.
Additionally, in the final section I address the current state of the park including the dominant
conservation models, prominent actors associated with the park, and funding mechanisms.

Towards Independence
Under Belgian authority, economic exploitation under the state regime proved equally
lucrative as it was under Leopold. I hesitate to emphasize the abundance of “natural resources” in
the Congo Basin, as this is typically a facet of the region which is both over-emphasized and
sensationalized (for example the film Blood Diamonds with Leonardo DiCaprio) The narrative of
African nations and the “resource curse” is a slippery slope to environmental determinism and
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not useful for understanding the history of extraction. It is not “valuable resources” which
determine the political fate of a nation, but rather the capitalist exploitation of said resources,
which, in the case of the Congo, is carried out by industrialized nations of the global North.
However, I believe that it is worthwhile to recognize the significance that resource extraction
played in the Belgian colonial regime as this is directly connected with current resource use in
the Virunga area.
As I mentioned earlier, the present-day nation of the DRC is swathed in forest, thus
making it a prime area for timber production. In addition to this, and to the ivory and cotton that
Leopold had exploited, the Belgians took advantage of a variety of other natural resources
present within the region. In 1892, a Belgian mineral exploration company discovered valuable
minerals and ores in the southern province of Katanga (Nzongola-Ntalaja 2002). Today, we
know that the extent of these minerals includes things such as diamonds (and other precious
gems), gold, tin, copper, cobalt, coltan, uranium, iron ore, tungsten, etc. Operating under what
Gondola refers to as the “colonial trinity” (state, mission, and company) the Belgian government
gave extensive authority for freedom of operation to large mining and extraction corporations in
the form of mandates (Gondola 2002). Thus, corporations were not only in control of land and
the land’s resources, but were also given the authority to build schools, medical centers, and
other infrastructure, thus inserting capital accumulation into the material fabric of the colony
itself (Gondola 2002). As the period of Belgian rule wore on, two processes were at work that
would prove important to the decolonization movement: rapid economic growth and
productivity of the colony (essentially none of which reached the colonized population), and
urbanization; both which would be important to the movement towards decolonization.
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Communities and individuals within the Belgian Congo resisted colonial exploitation,
both under Leopold and the Belgian state, in a myriad of ways. While under Leopold’s rule,
some communities participated in armed campaigns against the colonial regime. By the time the
Belgian authorities arrived, the communities of the Congo Basin were already weakened by the
constant violence, oppression, and exploitation of the colonial regime. Yet, many groups still
managed to resist, through avenues such as workers’ protests and peasants’ revolts. NzongolaNtalaja defines three main avenues through which colonial subjects resisted all forms of
imperialism: primary resistance (categorized as early, armed resistance to the imposition of
colonialism), religious based protest (The Kimbanguist movement), and anti-colonial revolts
including peasant rebellions and urban uprisings. In regards to three major uprisings between
1941 and 1954, Nzongola-Ntalaja writes,
All three revolts were partially a result of the hardships imposed on the African
population as part of the [WWII] war effort between 1940 and 1945. But they were above
all a response to colonialism as a system of exploitation and oppression. After their brutal
suppression, which included massacres, the Belgians responded to their fear of urban
unrest not only with the infamous operations policieres in African townships, but also
with better economic and social services for their restless subjects, in the hope of keeping
the public eye on bread and circuses. Fortunately, the improved standard of living in
urban areas could not quench the thirst for an even better life of freedom and material
abundance (2002, 53).
This often-violent struggle for human rights and liberation from colonial violent
oppression continued through the 1940’s and into the late 1950’s, gradually evolving into a large,
yet fractured African Nationalist Movement. The movement accelerated particularly quickly
however, amongst the educated urban elite, known as the “evolues” (Gondola 2002). From this
movement arose three main political parties, all advocating for some form of national
independence. The first was a moderate independence party known as MNC (Congolese
National Movement) led by former schoolteacher Patrice Lumumba. The second was a more
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radical group known as ABAKO and led by politician Joseph Kasavubu. The third was a
secessionist movement in the southern Katagan province led by a man named Moise Tshombe,
(Gondola 2002). Under these groups, political activism accelerated, and in January of 1959, a
pro-independence demonstration held in Leopoldville ultimately dissolved into a riot. The
Belgian government responded by ordering the colonial enforcement group the Force Publique
to massacre over 100 protesters (Gondola 2002).
The fallout from this event was significant, as it was perhaps the first time that the full
force of the nationalist movement was spread from the urban elites to the rural peasantry. The
Belgian, alarmed by this mobilization, called a roundtable meeting in Brussels with the leaders of
the three major Congolese parties in attendance. Belgium, not surprisingly, sought a deal in
which independence would not fully occur for 30 years. In the face of a growing decolonization
movement on the African continent however, and the shifting western public opinion away from
imperialist enterprises, favor was on the side of the Congolese. Congolese leaders successfully
negotiated terms which set Independence for summer of 1960. Thus, on June 30th 1960, the
Belgian Congo officially became the Republic of the Congo, with Joseph Kasavubu as president
and Patrice Lumumba as prime minister.
In the immediate aftermath of independence essentially about the operation of the Congo
changed, as the nation was still entirely dependent on colonial infrastructure and institutions.
Belgian authorities made it abundantly clear that they had no intention of giving up their
positions nor leaving the Congo. This proved especially contentious in the colonial police and
military force known as the Force Publique. Congolese soldiers had been under the impression
that independence would mean both better working conditions and a pay raise. [Once it was
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made evident that this was not the plan, Congolese Force Publique soldiers staged a mutiny
against their Belgian superiors and colonial loyalists.
The mutiny quickly spread throughout the territory, with Force Publique soldiers took up
arms and attempted to violently overthrow colonial institutions, and the Belgian population of
the Congo. Belgium, alarmed by the riots, deployed paratroopers to the republic on July 9th 1960.
They did so however, without consulting Lumumba or Kasabuvu, thus further demonstrating that
they in no way viewed the now independent nation as autonomous or beyond Belgian control.
While Kasabuvu attempted to justify the invasion, Lumumba loudly denounced it, thus
demonstrating the beginnings of a split between the two. Both however, could do little as the
situation devolved further; the central government was essentially rendered non-functional in the
face of widespread riots. To make things worse, under the direction of Moise Tshombe, Katanga,
the richest province resource wise, made a proclamation of secession on July 11th 1960. Another
southern province, South Kasai, followed on August 8th.
Belgium, under pressure from their citizens who lived in the Congo, issued a statement
that they would attempt to provide for Belgian citizens who had been residing in the Congo if
they decided to return. This produced a mass exodus of 10,000 Belgian colonists and settlers
from the territory. On July 14th 1960, the United Nations, under the direction of Secretary
General Dag Hammarskjold, called for the removal of all Belgian troops from the nation,
replacing them with UN “peacekeeping” forces. This is not the last time that the Congo would
meet a UN occupying force, as we will see. Characteristically ineffective at mitigating conflict,
UN peacekeeping troops were under orders not to take sides, nor support the struggling
Congolese government by helping to put down the Katangese secession movement.
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At this point, Lumumba decided to seek help elsewhere. He first asked the U.S and
president Dwight D. Eisenhower for support, which was quickly rejected. Desperate, he turned to
the Soviet Union for assistance. Kruschev was cooperative, and Soviet troops arrived and
quickly put down the South Kasai secession, but at the same time massacred hundreds of
members of an ethnic minority in the province, thus undercutting Lumumba’s credibility. The
United States and the Central Intelligence Agency viewed Lumumba’s request to the Soviet
Union as a surefire sign that he himself was a communist, and that the Congo would become a
communist state; the exact opposite of what the United States wanted at the start of the Cold
War. Thus, the US government began looking for ways to undercut Lumumba’s authority,
finding a potential solution in the recently appointed Congolese army chief of staff, Joseph
Mobutu.
With the chaos raging on, Mobutu quietly began amassing aid and personnel support
provided by the U.S CIA. Then, on September 5th 1960, Kasabuvu publicly announced on
national radio that he had dismissed Lumumba from the position of Prime Mminister, using the
South Kasai massacres as reasoning. Lumumba denied the dismal, thus creating a constitutional
crisis. Claiming military authority, Joseph Mobutu then staged a coup d’etat, siding with
Kasabuvu and placing Lumumba on house arrest. With his supporters fleeing to Stanleyville to
set up a rebel government under the remaining MNC leadership, Lumumba escaped house arrest
and attempted to move Eastward. Not long after however, he was captured by Mobutu’s forces,
and was executed by Katanga loyalists on Jan 17th 1961 (stuff about assassination, U.S role).
With Lumumba gone, Kasabuvu (who had been re-appointed president by Mobutu in 1961),
Mobutu, the Belgium government, and the UN began fighting the Katanga secession with force,
eventually ending it on Jan 21st 1963. Following this, some attempts were made at political
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reconciliation, a new constitution was drafted, and the county was renamed the “Democratic
Republic of the Congo” in June 1964. The unrest however, was not over. Unhappy with a
centralized government, communities staged a number of rebellions, the largest of which was the
Simba rebellion, in which half of the country was rebel occupied. From 1964-65 the region was
flooded with European mercenaries, Belgians, and the UN, attempting to put down the various
“rebel” movements.
In September 1965, after quelling most of the major conflicts Mobutu staged a second
coup, with U.S and European support, deposing Kasabuvu and thus ushering in one of the most
devastating kleptocracies of the 20th century. Fanon, in his work on the violent processes of
decolonization can perhaps help us understand the violent processes of decolonization mentioned
above,
National liberation, national renaissance, the restoration of nationhood to the people,
commonwealth: whatever may be the headings used or the new formulas introduced,
decolonization is always a violent phenomenon. At whatever level we study it—
relationships between individuals, new names for sports clib, the human admixture at
cocktail parties, in the police, on the directing boards of national or private banks—
decolonization is quite simply the the replacing of a certain “species” of men by another
“species” of men...To tell the truth, the proof of success lies in a whole social structure
being changed from the bottom up. The extraordinary importance of this change is that it
is willed, called for, demanded (1963, 65).
From Prince Albert National Park to Virunga
After independence in 1960, just as with most facets of the new formed DRC, the
Belgians stayed closely involved with conservation, and with Park Albert (Marijnen and
Verweijen 2016). Mobutu appointed a Belgian official as the director of state conservation in
1969 and gave the park administration the authority to expel poachers and trespassers on the
Park Albert Land with force (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016). Additionally, Mobutu’s reafricanization campaign attempted to rid Zaire of colonial names, which included Park Albert;
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thus, the name Virunga National Park was adopted. During the postcolonial period, foreign aid
was crucial to the functioning of the park, specifically aid from the European Commission and
the Frankfurt Zoological society (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016).
With regard to larger scale historical processes in the Congo, in the period following the
Congo crisis, the political intricacies become less important than the dominant economic and
social impacts of Mobutu’s western sponsored demagoguery. The story however is not quite as
an autocrat gone bad. In the wake of massive upheaval and violence, the Congolese people were
at this point, exasperated by` the unsuccessful plight of armed struggle (Wrong 2000). Thus, the
stability that Mobutu provided, was at the time, both welcome and extremely popular, and would
be for years to come (Wrong 2000).
Mobutu’s consolidation of power was slow. He was extremely charismatic, easily
developing a “cult of personality” around his. Additionally, he was propped up by the US
government, who feared the “iron curtain” they saw closing around the African Continent.
(Tanzania, the Congo’s eastern neighbor had adopted a type of nationalist socialism, further
panicking The United States and its allies,) Throughout his regime, the U.S, along with
organizations such as the IMG and World Bank, repeatedly appeased Mobutu, hoping to keep an
anti-socialist regime in power.
In the years directly following independence and into the early 70’s, Mobutu retained the
support of the majority of the Congolese people. So much so that the formation of his own
political party, The Popular Movement of the Revolution (MPR) did not immediately signal an
abuse of power. Mobutu even held elections, in which only his party was allowed to run. Despite
this clear movement towards a despotic state, the consolidation of power that his regime
accomplished was extremely successful. In 1971, he mandated the start of an authentic “re-
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africanization” movement in order to allow the people of the Congo to “rediscover their African
identity” (Wrong 2000). This movement was perhaps one of the only positive legacies of
Mobutu’s time in power. The Re-authentication involved renaming The Democratic Republic of
the Congo, to “Zaire” and renaming Prince Albert National Park to Virunga, as mentioned
above. Additionally, colonial names of buildings, streets, and infrastructure, were erased and
replaced with more traditional African ones. Western dress was banned, and children were
banned from having European names. Additionally, in a final condemnation of colonialism,
statues of Leopold and other colonial figures were toppled.
This display of Zairean nationalism however, would not last. Although Mobutu took back
foreign economic holdings and “redistributed” them to the Zairean people, it soon became
apparent that he himself was holding onto quite a few properties, such as the largest plantation in
the country. The regime quickly devolved into nepotism, corruption, and embezzlement. As
Mobutu amassed more and more personal wealth, the Congo plunged into an economic
downturn, plagued by massive inflation and international debt. Wrong notes that the Zairean
people were keenly aware of such behavior, once again failed by a government which did
nothing to prevent economic devastation,
The Zaireans had developed their own language to deal with this depressing reality,
ironic word games replete with skepticism, the only form of quiet rebellion on offer in a
system seemingly imperious to change. Cock-ups were attributed to ‘Facteur Z’, the
Zairean factor, delays to “Heure Zaairoise’, the lethargic local time scale. The capital
once known as ‘Kin-la-belle’ was now dubbed ‘Kin-la-poubelle’ (Kinshasa, the rubbish
dump), testimony to the mountains of garbage collected but never taken away. The men
who sold stolen petrol on the roadside were known as ‘Khadafis’, in tribute to Libya’s oil
rich president, while the urchins who slept on the street were called ‘phaseurs’ (Lingala
slang for sleepers) because, a friend joked, ‘they were in phase with life’. The
unemployed young men with nothing to do but stand on street concerns discussing
topical issues were scornfully dismissed as ‘parlementaires debouts’ (standing
parliamentarians). Ask one of these how he was doing and the answer would never be the
automatic ‘bien’. ‘Au rythme du pays’, (in time with the country) he would reply, with a
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shrug, or ‘au taux du jour (at the day’s rate) a reference to the national currency’s
unstoppable decline. (135).
By the time his reign was over, its estimated that Mobutu amassed anywhere between 4 billion
and 15 billion U.S dollars; he spent itd on things such as expensive clothes, and his numerous
estates spread across the nation. Although he at times seemed imperious to forces working
against him, Mobutu’s reign did in fact come to an end, in spring of 1997.

The Kivus in the First and Second Congo Wars
It is at this point that the national history of the DRC begins to become directly relevant
to the Kivus, and to Virunga. While understanding the basic political and colonial histories of the
nation is crucial to avoiding tropes of the tribal warfare and the danger discourse tied to the
African continent, the following events quite literally had a profound physical impact upon the
park itself. I do not have the space nor the expertise to chronicle the entirety of the Rwandan
genocide. Yet, what occurred in Rwanda is closely tied to the contemporary state of affairs in the
DRC. Though I provide an extremely simplified summary of what occurred, narrating the impact
of the Rwandan genocide and the resulting First and Second Congo wars, is imperative to
understanding building the historical foundation on which conservation in Virunga rests.
Beginning in 1994, as the tide turned against Hutu forces in Rwanda, Hutu (and Tutsi)
refugees, numbered in the hundreds of thousands, began fleeing into Eastern Zaire (recall that
Virunga lies over the Rwandan border) (McCalpin 2001). Most of these people ended up in
massive refugee camps just across the Zairean border. With the fleeing refugees however, came
high ranking commanders and soldiers of the Interahamwe, or Hutu militia, commonly the group
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commonly known and accepted to have committed much of the genocide (Prunier). In his
seminal work on what has come to be known as “Africa’s World War”, Prunier writes,
“Contrary to other refugee exoduses from countries at war, this was not the light of
individuals wishing to escape danger; rather, just as the genocide had been, it was an
organized system of mass mobilization for a political purpose. The refugees settled in
their camps in perfect order, under the authority of their former leaders, ready to be used
for further aims. (2004, 24).
Here it can be assumed Prunier writes of the Hutu soldiers settling into the camps, as opposed to
many women, men, and children who sought shelter only to find a military camp unofficially
sanctioned by the UNHCR’s (United Nations High Council for Refugees) refusal to counteract
the situation (Prunier 2004). Thus, as he writes “these camps were an uneasy compromise
between genuine refugee settlements and war machines built for the reconquest of power in
Rwanda (2004, 25).
As this was taking place, Mobutu was gradually losing power. Following the end of the
cold war, the U.S drew back support along with the IMF and the World Bank, thus wielding a
blow to the power of the regime. Additionally, the people of Zaire became adamant that the ban
on opposition parties was no longer acceptable. Yet, Mobutu still retained mass amount of
political power. McCalpin writes,
In the over three decades of Zaire’s independence the only constant had been
patrimonialism, authoritarianism, and political decline. Neither a political culture strong
enough to build democracy no an opposition strong enough to oppose an authoritarian
regime had emerged. This period of the unraveling state (1990-96) reaffirmed the
postcolonial instability and lack of a national consciousness. In the absence of a
formidable alternative to the Mobutu regime, the Zairean state reached very near to the
point of collapse (2001, 46).
In a seemingly last-ditch attempt to hold onto power, Mobutu initiated a mass persecution of the
Banyamulenge people (an indigenous tutsi minority) as a type of scapegoat to detract from the
failure of his regime, and to display support for the genocidaires that he had allowed to take up
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residence in the refugee camps (McCalpin 2001). This however, did not proceed as he had
hoped. By 1996 the Banyamulenge had begun a full-scale rebellion in the Kivus. Additionally,
Rwanda in September of 1996, Rwandan forces invaded Zaire in an effort to dismantle the
militarized refugee camps. Paul Kagame, president of Rwanda, was anti-Mobutu and saw the
invasion as part of a long-term plan to eventually end his regime (Prunier 2004). All of this
resulted in an extreme political destabilization of both the weakened central government, and
most of the eastern region, specifically the Kivus.
In the midst of all this, a politician, /soldier, and /activist named Laurent Kabila, who had
originally opposed Mobutu’s rise to power, took advantage of the destabilization. Under the
banner of an organization known as the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of
Congo (ADFL), Kabila garnered support from Rwanda, Uganda, and Angola. While Mobutu was
away seeking medical treatment for prostate cancer in Europe, Kabila began his march on the
capital. Recognizing his imminent defeat, Mobutu fled to Morocco in May of 1997 and
succumbed to his cancer 3 months later. Kabila quickly assumed control, proclaiming himself
president and once again restoring the name of the nation to the Democratic Republic of Congo
(McCalpin 2001).

Laurent Kabila, despite his Lumumba-ist and Marxist origins, was disappointingly
Mobutu like in his career as president. It’s well accepted that his governing practices were aimed
at maintaining political power; as he used mechanisms such as ethnic politics and patrimonialism
(McCalpin 2001). More importantly however, Kabila’s rise to power was not the end of the
Congo conflicts. A year after the official end of the first Congo war, another conflict broke out in
the already war-torn eastern region, lasting until 2003. This conflict, driven by a number of
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similar factors to the first Congo war, was devastating, resulting in the deaths of an estimated 5.4
million people. Additionally, in January of 2001, Laurent Kabila was assassinated by his
bodyguard, likely for reasons pertaining to the war and conflict with Rwanda (Kabila had
quickly alienated his Rwandan and Ugandan allies while in power). His son, Joseph Kabila
assumed the Congolese presidency as his successor, and remains in power today.
Noting the impacts of the aforementioned conflicts is arguably more important than
focusing upon the political intricacies. It is self-evident that the colonial devastation experienced
by the Congo region, the interference of external international bodies, and the failure of
international peacekeeping, must all be seen as factors in the numerous conflicts that make up the
DRC’s history. More specifically however, the most recent conflicts have had a profound impact
on both the state of the Congo today, and the political climate of the Kivu region, home of
Virunga National Park.
The second Congo war is an extremely complex event that has received little scholarly
attention. Its impacts however, are frequently noted, oftentimes with little reference to the
context which created them. Despite the official end to the Second Congo War in 2003, the
proliferation of armed groups, specifically in the Eastern region, is a continuing phenomenon.
(As recently as January of this year, Joseph Kabila has refused to hold fair elections, thus
furthering a distrust of the central government.). Additionally, most of the deaths recorded during
the second Congo war, were due to malnutrition and disease, as opposed to being the direct result
of armed conflict (Koyame 2001). As Koyame notes, displacement played a large role in these
casualties, “Large-scale death, it would seem, is the ultimate consequence of economic
disruption for those living on the economic margins of a developing society” (2001, 202). The
war has produced extremely unfavorable economic conditions resulting in a decrease in GDP,
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inflation, undercutting by the growth of the “informal sector” (black market), and the lack of
integration between government held and rebel held areas (international trade is effectively
impossible) (Koyame 2001). Population statistics remain dismal, with high rates of disease,
poverty, and average life expectancy of 59 years.
Accordingly, the proliferation of armed factions or “rebel groups” (the term rebel to
refers to any armed group that acts independently from the central government) is widespread,
particularly in the eastern border regions. Peace agreements in the early 2000’s saw some
progress, but the refusal of the younger Kabila to leave office has exacerbated existing problems,
leading to a re-proliferations of certain rebel groups. At present, the political future of the nation
appears to be uncertain. It is from this context and this history that I move to chronicle the
development and operation of Virunga in the present day.

Park Operations Today: Tourism, Anti-Poaching, and Enforcement
In 1994, following the Rwandan genocide, refugees and internally displaced persons
flooded into the Kivus and the general Virunga areas. Their presence, according the Marinjnen
caused environmental damage and resulted in another “state of emergency” for the park.
Following the second Congo war, a number of militia groups are still active in the region, most
of which oppose the central government now run under the younger Kabila. According to park
management local militias oftentimes seek to exploit the park’s natural resources (Virunga
2018). This unrest therefore, is still utilized as legitimation for far reaching foreign involvement
in the park. In a problematic sense therefore, it is apparent that little has changed from the
colonial rhetoric of the inability of African people’s to “manage” the environment, thus
necessitating European guidance in order to ensure the survival of flora and fauna.
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Today, the park, is heavily funded by the European Commission, the Frankfurt
Zoological society, USAID, and run via a public-private partnership between the Virunga
Alliance (previously the African Conservation Fund) and the central government of the DRC,
specifically the ICCN (L’Institut Congolais Pour la Conservation de la Nature) (Marijnen and
Verweijen 2016). Emmanuel De Merode, a Belgian prince and conservation, is the head director
of the park, appointed in 2007 after the previous Congolese director was accused of allowing
local militias to kill a number of the park’s gorillas to decrease the economic value of the park
(Marijnen and Verweijen 2016).
The park area itself does encompass a number of small fishing villages on the shores of
Lake Edward (Virunga 2018). Resource usage in these communities is highly. regulated by the
park. Other local communities on the outskirts of the park are forbidden from harvesting any
type of natural resource from the park areas, including firewood, fish, game, etc. (Virunga 2008).
Poaching is of large concern to park authorities and the armed wildlife rangers who patrol the
park regularly are in place to deter both poachers and militia groups (Virunga 2018). The park
has recently attempted to improve relations with local communities through providing
infrastructure such as schools and community centers, and through a “sustainable economic
development plan” which includes the development of a large-scale hydropower plant in the
Virunga area (Virunga 2018). As I will discuss however, problems still abound. Marijnen makes
an insightful point in stating that, “external and militarized interventions also continue to be
legitimized by colonially scripted images of the Congo as ‘the heart of darkness’, a place of
backwardness and irrationality that needs to be civilized” (280).
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Chapter IV: Neo-Colonial Natures: Militarization, Exploitation, and the Spectacle
of the Wildlife Ranger

S: “What’s interesting is that Virunga seems to have become an island of stability and hope in
eastern DRC, whereas other parks in Africa are often viewed quite negatively because they don’t
seem to bring any benefits to the local communities or the local people”.

E: “It’s nice to hear it put that way, but the reality is that there are still enormous tensions
between the park and the people...”

(Emmanuel De Merode in an interview with African wildlife photographer Scott Ramsay,
2017)

From the outside, The Pasiansi Wildlife Training Institute, in Mwanza, Tanzania, looks
like any other school campus. With bright green lawns, manicured flower beds, and simple
white-washed buildings, it more resembles a teacher’s college or forestry school rather than a
paramilitary institute. What gives it away is the students. Clad head to toe in khaki and combat
boots, with the Tanzania National Parks Logo emblazoned on their chests, students march to and
from their classes, saluting their instructors as they went. I visited Pasiansi Institute to conduct
interviews about ranger trainees’ perceptions of conservation practice in Tanzania. As I visitor, I
too, was offered the usual passing salute, which I returned awkwardly in my faltering Kiswahili.
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Most of the students at the institute were around my age. Every day for two weeks I came
to the school to talk with around 10 of them, one on one, in the Institute's main conference room.
Some days, I watched evening drill practice outside, led by an ex-commander of the Tanzanian
People’s Defense Force. I sat on the grass with my notebook and watched in stunned silence as
120 students executed perfect marching drills, command relays, and rifle draws. In each of my
interviews, I asked the students how they envisioned using their military training when they were
assigned to a Tanzanian national park. Some said that it would help them survive if they were
ever lost in one of the larger areas, others would mention that knowing how to use a weapon
could protect them from animals like African Buffalo or Hippos, yet almost all the interviewees,
without exception, responded that their military skills would help them fight poachers.1
My findings at Pasiansi were no surprise. I had been in Tanzania long enough to witness
the militarized models under which protected wilderness areas were run. Parks like the Serengeti
were regularly patrolled by armed rangers, and any nearby residents, never mind poachers, who
entered the park without permission faced devastating consequences, ranging from the
confiscation of their cattle to grievous bodily injury. Yet, Tanzania depended heavily upon the
revenue generated from the parks, making the extreme measures taken to preserve wildlife
appear economically logical. This mode of conservation, known in political ecology scholarship
as “fortress conservation” is now arguably the most common mechanism of operation employed
by wilderness areas across the world. In this way, Virunga is no exception. In this next chapter, I
will explore the deployment of the “fortress model” and “green militarization” in Virunga,
outlining underlying causes of this shift in conservation practice, and its potential consequences.
Next, I will explore the work of Marijnen and Verweijen on the discursive production of
1

The African Buffalo and Common Hippopotamus are actually two of the animals on the African Savanna which
pose the greatest risk to humans.
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militarization in Virunga, outlining their theoretical argument that the violence associated with
militarization is legitimated via discursive processes and wealthy foreign actors. Next, building
off of Marijnen and Verweijen’s arguments, I will incorporate an analysis of Debord's theory of
spectacle in the discursive production of militarization, undertaking a brief analysis of recent
twitter data about Virunga. Then, transitioning from this analysis, I move into a discussion of the
portrayal of Virunga’s rangers. Finally, I end with a discussion of the type of “nature” fortress
conservation is able to produce.

Green Militarization and the Fortress Conservation Model
Trained to defend the park’s boundaries and prominent megafauna from poachers,
trespassers, and militia, wildlife rangers are typically portrayed as bearing the brunt of the labor
associated with making a protected wildlife area a “secure” one. This “securitization” typically
manifests in parks such as Virunga as keeping unauthorized others (local people) out, and
wildlife inside. This process, as I will discuss, is removed, in discursive materials, from the
factors which produced it, leading to little popular engagement with the consequences of
militarized conservation mechanisms. The contemporary figure of the wildlife ranger,
specifically within the context of Central-East Africa, is closely tied to larger social and
economic forces, which have the potential to drive the visualization of an “ideal” wilderness and
exclusionary nature discourses. I propose, along with others (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016;
Marijnen 2017; Verweijen and Marijnen 2018, and Marijnen 2018) that the usage of wildlife
rangers and associated technologies in Virunga can be seen as a form of “green militarization”.
Understanding green militarization, and its manifestation in protected areas, particularly
in the global South, is crucial to understanding the state of wildlife conservation today.

64
Lundstrum, in her work on conservation in South Africa’s Kruger National Park, introduced the
term “green militarization” as “the use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors,
techniques, technologies, and partnerships in the pursuit of conservation” (817, 2014). Thus,
green militarization in contemporary conservation practice manifests itself in a variety of ways.
As Lundstrum points out, in Kruger National park, militarization manifests via the use of a
national defense force (South African National Defense Force) as park guards (2014). In
Tanzanian parks, east of the Congo, green militarization appears as advanced weaponry, military
grade detection technology, and increasing use of violent force in anti-poaching policy.2
Relatedly, in Virunga itself we see these processes at work in exclusionary land use policies,
military-style anti-poaching tactics, and the participation of park forces in regional militia
infighting.
Green militarization is an undeniable defining feature of the larger preservation model
known as fortress conservation. The fortress model, as described by Doolittle, is a predominant
mechanism of biodiversity conservation, in which it is assumed that the protection of ecosystems
is best accomplished with people, and “human society” absent (Doolittle 2007). Thus, parks that
fall under the “fortress” categorization are exclusionary entities; at some point or another, the
people who had lived there were dispossessed of their land and expelled from the premises
(Doolittle 2007). In this way, the fortress model assumes a type of Malthusian inability of
humans to exist peacefully with so called natural systems (Doolittle 2007). Individuals expelled
from fortress conservation areas are thus separated from their “natural resource base” and from
the subsistence that the land may have previously provided (Doolittle 2007). Furthermore, in his
work on the Mkomazi protected area in Tanzania, Brockington notes that land loss and
2

I spent over a month camping in Tanzania National Park in Spring of 2017, studying the political ecology of
conservation. Fortress conservation in Tanzania manifests itself extremely clearly, as exclusionary land policies, and
advanced military training for Wildlife Rangers.
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dispossession is an unfortunate, but common occurrence within the realm of East-Central
African conservation practice (Brockington 2002).
Doolittle points to three main defining factors of fortress conservation: separation of
previous land tenants from the natural resource base, enforcement of a “fence and fines” model
by park rangers or other related officials, and the prohibition of activities that do not fall under
the umbrella of tourism, safari hunting, or research (Doolittle 2007). If we bring together these
elements it becomes evident that the protected areas in question quite literally become a type of
“fortress”, in which those who don’t belong are expelled, and kept outside via forced borders and
laws. Not surprisingly, these types of policies tend to promote ill-will between state or
conservation authorities and local residents forced out of their homes. With regard to the Maasai
people of East Africa and their concerns about the process, Igoe writes,
Many of my informants described conservation as indistinguishable from any of the other
global processes they confronted in their daily lives. Its bottom line was the alienation of
traditional grazing lands for the benefit and enjoyment of other people, the majority of
whom, from their perspective, were white and not even from Tanzania. As far as they
were concerned, this was essentially unfair (2007, 9).
Brockington adds, pointing to the ineffectiveness of the fortress model, “parks are surrounded
by people who do not condone their presence and who actively, in their daily lives, undermine or
defy the regulations protecting the park’s wildlife and resources” (2002, 8).
Thus, the fortress model has come under significant scholarly criticisms for both its
marginalization of local populations (oftentimes bordering upon a violation of human rights),
and for its ineffectiveness at preventing the very degradation it supposedly aims to stop (Igoe
2004, Brockington 2002). Moreover, green militarization functions as the primary way to
physically enforce conservation areas’ exclusionary principles. This exclusion is built into the
ability of conservation areas to generate capital as commodities in the global economy. A
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discussion of militarization in conservation areas would, therefore, not be complete without a
mention of neoliberal processes.

Neoliberalisation and Primitive Accumulation
The fortress model, as many scholars argue, is closely tied to processes of late capitalism,
namely neoliberalism. Brockington and Igoe argue that neoliberalism is the process of
restructuring the world to allow it to better participate in free markets (2007). In this way, while
typically popularized as a type of economic “deregulation” in order to rid states of the
interference of corrupt governments, and to allow the free market to work its magic, in
conservation, Brockington and Igoe argue, neoliberalization functions in reality as a type of “reregulation” (2007). In this way, landscapes and institutions are transformed so to better
participate in a capital driven market (Brockington and Igoe 2007).
According to Büsher, over time capitalism has shifted from a “blood and fire” approach
to primitive accumulation (i.e colonialism), to creating what he calls “enabling environments”, or
environments transformed by neoliberal processes to allow for capital accumulation (Buscher
2009). Thus, many contemporary conservation areas can be viewed in the context of their ability
to enable capital accumulation in line with neoliberal principles.
It follows that the commodification of nature and biodiversity within conservation areas,
relies on the continued dispossession of local residents, to allow for the “ideal nature” to be
“saved through its submission to capital and its subsequent revaluation in capitalist terms”
(Büscher 2009).

Virunga as Fortress: A Continuation of the Colonial Project
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Within Virunga National Park, the realities of the fortress model are consequential
primarily for the individuals who either previously resided within park boundaries or whose
livelihoods depend upon resources inside in the protected area. Yet this model also involves
significant risk of bodily harm for those who work in the park. As I mentioned previously,
exclusionary land policies are a significant part of the park’s history. Verschuren writes that in an
early attempt to expand the park in 1932, colonial authorities reasserted that,
the objective of maintaining the absolute integrity of areas within the National Park by
reducing human intervention to an absolute minimum, not just for aesthetic reasons, or
for the promotion of tourism (as had been emphasized when creating both Yellowstone in
the United States and Kruger Park in South Africa), but also for the sake of preserving a
natural heritage as a basis for increasing scientific understanding (2009, 67).
Park policy still operates under this assumption that good aesthetics, attractive tourism,
preservation, and successful scientific expeditions cannot be achieved with a significant human
presence in the park. Additionally, within a historical framework, the desire of indigenous/local
populations to have access to land rights or resource use rights, is still consistently framed by
park authorities as an “economic agenda” (Van Schuylenbergh 2009). The park’s history is
marked by antagonism between park authorities and local populations, fueled by land
dispossession and the separation of indigenous people from their resource base. Indeed, as
Verwijen and Marijnen write,
The antagonism resulting from the way the park was created and managed sparked
widespread resistance. Displaced populations regularly occupied parts of the park and
continued to cultivate, hunt, and fish on its territory (Vikanza 2011). Furthermore, in
particular in the second half of the 1950’s, acts of aggression against park guards, park
installations and wildlife, or what Van Schuylenbergh (2009. 39) calls ‘braconnage du
resistance’ (resistance poaching), were frequent, as part of wider hostility against
(symbols of) what was seen as unjust land occupation and the colonial regime. In
response, surveillance was increased and a military-trained and arms-bearing corps of
park guards was recruited, including from among ex-soldiers of the colonial army (Van
Schuylenbergh 2009) (2016, 9).
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Jacques Verschuren, Belgian biologist, and an explorer of the park through much of the
of the 20th century, attempted to offer a defense of the dubious exclusionary land policies,
stating,
Early land-use surveys carried out in the Northern Sector of the park, detected no sign of
contemporary human occupation. A few claimants, opposed to the park’s creation, were
diplomatically persuaded, without pressure from the authorities, to settle on better lands,
and were given generous financial compensation. There are no surviving eyewitnesses,
however, and living descendants now know nothing at all about the events of that period.
Most of the official documents detailing such transfers of financial compensation were
destroyed during the troubles of 1960....Throughout the 1950’s, problems relating to land
claims were the last thing park rangers ever had to deal with.... In all the years I have
spent roving, no Congolese associate of mine has ever said: ‘This is the land of my
forefathers; it is where they are buried (2009, 79).
Vershuren’s explanations are both rosy and exceedingly convenient; they also directly contradict
much of the recorded history of the Virunga and the legacies of park-community conflict,
referenced in Chapter 3, which still exists in the present.

Mediating Militarization
Thus, the fortress model in Virunga began not long after its official founding. Within this
model, we can also see historical evidence of the development of militarized methods and an
early ranger force. Carl Akeley, in this 1926 publication “In Brightest Africa” about the Gorillas
of the Virunga area, encourages the development of a gorilla sanctuary in the land between three
of the volcanoes. He writes,
To create this sanctuary would be comparatively easy and inexpensive. I think it would
require first of all that the sanctuary be bounded by a road….The road would be chiefly
for police purposes to make it easier to be sure that hunters stayed outside. The policing
of the road could be done by the natives. As the pay for such a policeman is about five
cents a day, the maintenance of the force is not a great matter (1926, 250)
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In the very founding of Virunga therefore, we see the origins of militarization and the
establishment of a ranger force which is clearly rooted in the colonial project. As white
colonialists were able to purchase gorillas hunting permits, it’s safe to assume that “hunters”
refers to the activities of the local population. Moving through the 20th century, the
militarization process under the fortress conservation model continued to develop.3 A 1985
Frankfurt Zoological Society gorilla conservation project report chronicled the state of facilities
in the park, explicitly mentioning anti-poaching teams and patrols. In one section of the report,
the authors discuss how retired military gear from the UK is shipped to outfit park staff. Worth
noting is another section which states,
Rations have been provided for regular 10-day patrols from Kabara gate, and with the
incentive of a 2-Zaire bonus for every trap collected, many traps have been removed from
the park. On several occasions gun fire from elephant poachers has been heard deep in
the park near the border with Rwanda, and rations have been provided for emergency
patrols when necessary (Aveling 1985, 4).
Apparently, Zairean rangers were “incentivized” via a monetary bonus in order to collect
as many snares as possible. Referring back to the history of the DRC, 1985 is the beginning of
the decline of Mobutu’s regime, therefore making it extremely likely that the communities
around Virunga were suffering economically. Additionally, this type of economic exploitation
harkens back in a disturbing manner to the supposed “payment” that Congolese men would
receive during the colonial period based upon how much rubber they could harvest (see Chapter
2).
A discursive analysis of the portrayal of these militarized methods in Virunga would not
be complete without mentioning the work of Marijnen and Verweijen. Over the past five years,
Marijnen and Verweijen have published a number of works discussing the prevalence and
3

This report was retrieved from the online archives of the Belgian Museum of Central Africa, which maintains a
limited database of material relating to conservation in the belgian congo and post-colonial Zaire.
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impacts of militarization in Virunga, from the approach of state-building, community
participation, and international funding and intervention (see Marijnen and Verweijen 2016;
Marijnen 2017; Verweijen and Marijnen 2018; and Marijnen 2018). The pair has conducted
extensive ethnographic and discursive research, highlighting the perspectives of residents in
close proximity to the park. In particular, in “The counterinsurgency/conservation nexus: guerilla
livelihoods and the dynamics of conflict and violence in the Virunga National Park, Democratic
Republic of Congo”, they address the livelihood practices of local residents, with an emphasis on
resistance to park regulations (Verweijen and Marijnen 2018).
Of particular relevance to my thesis is their work on the “discursive (re)production of
militarized conservation” within Virunga park (Marijnen and Verweijen 2016). In this particular
piece, Marijnen and Verweijen argue that intense militarization within the park is legitimized via
a “range of discursive techniques” that allow it to be seen as a ‘normal’ and ‘legitimate’
response. This legitimation however, is not, they argue, new, but rather draws from colonial
tropes and “moral boundary drawing” (2016). They argue that today’s green militarization is
therefore based on colonial “othering” but has been transformed and intensified by the advent of
global neoliberalism and neoliberal conservation (2016).
Drawing from Lundstrum, Verweijen and Marijnen define green militarization as “the
use of military and paramilitary (military-like) actors, techniques, technologies, and partnerships
in the pursuit of conservation” (Lundstrum 2014, 817; 2016). Methodologically, both authors
undertook a discourse analysis of materials from the park, and conducted ethnographic field
work in the Virunga area between 2013-2016.
The heart of Marijnen and Verweijen’s argument is that current militarization within the
park is justified via colonial mechanisms that have been transformed and intensified by
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neoliberal processes. They begin by explaining the manifestation of green military practice in
conservation as a two-fold discursive and material process in which “military actors and
instruments are only deployed to ‘save nature’ when this is seen as a ‘normal’, ‘rational’, and
‘legitimate’ response” (2016, 285). This process is therefore justified by a set of discursive
techniques, which the authors define as “re-curring configurations of narratives, imagery, and
discursive practices that frame social phenomenon, thereby authorizing and privileging certain
forms of knowledge, actors, and modes of action, while delegitimizing and obscuring others”
(2016, 285). Pointing back to my discussion of the importance of discourse analysis, in defining
discursive techniques, Marijnen and Verwijen articulate the ways in which discourse is able to
“privilege” knowledge in order to form possible realities and actions. In this same way, dominant
discursive techniques are able to obscure those with less power, such as the discourses emerging
from the subaltern voices of the Congo and the area surrounding Virunga.
The authors perform an extensive discursive analysis of the forms of militarized
discourses emerging from the park to legitimate the violence used in enforcing park boundaries.
Of particular relevance to my analysis is their discussion of colonial discourses. Marijnen and
Verwijen point to a long history of conservation on the African continent as dictated by colonial
and racial tropes (2016, 273). Europeans’ justification for the establishment of protected areas
was frequently tied to ideas of African racial and cultural inferiority, and therefore the
presumptions of inevitable “mismanagement” of the environment by local people (2016, 273).
They argue that discourses that emerge from Virunga National Park unconsciously draw from
this these tropes in an attempt to gain popular support for conservation initiatives and to
legitimate the use of force in dispelling poachers. They write,
Although the Virunga Park’s marketing and communications strategies are carefully
designed, and media reporting on the park often deliberately paints a positive image, this
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does not imply that they are consciously engineered towards legitimizing and
normalizing militarized interventions. Rather, those producing discourses and imagery,
often with the explicit intention to mobilize support and funds for the park, draw on
exiting tropes and narratives and representations of conservation as currently practiced
(2016, 273).
In this way, the deployment of colonial narratives is not necessarily a conscious choice by actors
within the park, but rather in keeping with larger themes of the global neo-imperialist discourse
that pervades contemporary fortress models. Marijnen and Verweijen’s analysis of the
legitimation of militarization in the park also relies on Debord’s idea of spectacle and the
subsequent “spectacular mediation” of violent realities inside Virunga. Debord’s “spectacle”
proves particularly useful when discussing the mediation of reality by images (discourses). The
essence of the spectacle points to the idea that images render realities and lived experience as
commodities to be consumed (Debord 2010). As Igoe states, “Debord saw such mediation as a
central feature of late capitalism, in which images become commodities alienated from the
relationships that produced them and consumed in ignorance of the same” (2010, 375).
In this way, images of militarized conservation practice are also alienated from their
material realities. Those exposed to the images consume them in ignorance of the potential
consequences of such a process through removed fetishization of the discursive formations.
Marijnen and Verweijen argue that images of green militarization in Virunga are heavily
“spectacularized”, thus the representations are vastly different than the realities of park
practices. In the same way, the processes which have produced this militarization, and the
consequences of it, are obscured via mediation. Drawing from Igoe’s “The spectacle of nature in
the global economy of appearances: Anthropological engagements with the spectacular
mediations of transnational conservation” (2010), Marijnen and Verweijen write,
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Conservation spectacle generates a self-referential universe based on a dialogical process
between images of wildlife and wilderness landscapes and the representation that
informed their production. These spectacular visual meditations, which are engineered to
communicate ‘conservation success’ and mobilize consumers, are only indirectly
connected to the place they represent, characterize as they are by “a double act of
fetishization” (Igoe, 20120: 389): Not only is the history and context of the featured
phenomenon obscured, thereby fetishizing the presented relationships, the relationships
that enabled this concealment in the first place are also rendered invisible. In this manner,
spectacular production “become their own evidence, continuously referring back to
themselves in affirmation of the realness of the world(s) that they show their viewers
(Igoe in Marijnen and Verweijen 2014, 273).
Marijnen and Verweijen point out that almost all of the imagery of Virunga has some sort of
spectacularized presentation associated with it. As we will see in Chapter 6, Debord’s theory also
applies to ecotourism within the park. Following Marijen and Verweijen, in the next section I
will explore the application of spectacle to the representation of the actors associated with
enforcing the militarized conservation model: wildlife rangers.

Spectacle and Exploitation: The Virunga Ranger as Conservation Martyr
In their article, Marijnen and Verweijen provide numerous discursive examples of the
way in which militarization is legitimated via colonial and racial narratives. In particular, they
point to the way in which the faceless depictions of “rebels” and poachers is used as a kind of
othering device that deploys neo-barbarism imagery, thus justifying the use of violence to
combat them (2016, 278). In particular, I would like to focus on the role of the individuals
expected to combat the “others”: Virunga’s wildlife rangers.
In popular media, Virunga’s rangers are portrayed as heroes who are quite literally
willing to die in order to save the gorillas and maintain the integrity of the park. In regards to the
imagery of the ranger Marijnen and Verweijen write,
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Complementing but ultimately remaining subordinate to, the white-commander in chief
or trainer, the self-sacrificing African guards form the ‘boots on the ground’ in the way
for biodiversity. By strongly emphasizing the dangers to which the rangers are exposed,
and the tragedy of their occasional loss of life, the park guard emerges as a martyr of
conservation. Consequently, the violence employed by the guards is moved beyond the
realm of scrutiny-because it is effectuated by a heroic figure, we merely assume that it is
necessary and legitimate (2016, 277).
While Marijnen and Verweijen do mention the ways in which the deaths of park rangers
are spectacularized (nothing is ever published about how they have died yet we are bombarded
with imagery of their funerals), they primarily address how the militarized actions of the park
guards are legitimated (2016, 280). Taking this topic in a different direction, I will analyze the
ways in which the personhood and lived experiences of Virunga’s rangers are rendered invisible
via an intense spectacularization process, ultimately exploiting their role in conservation in an
attempt to gather donations and popular support. While problematizing the role that rangers play
in militarized conservation and in the penalization of communities nearby to Virunga is
important, so too is acknowledging their status as a subordinated group encased within larger
legacies of the colonial conservation project.
I will begin this analysis with a brief discussion of twitter data pertaining to Virunga’s
Rangers. As explained in Chapter 1, I collected all tweets containing the hashtag #Virunga for a
period of three months. Then, I generated a word cloud showing the most commonly used terms
within the dataset (See Appendix 1). Next, using Nvivo, I searched the entire collection of tweets
for the word “ranger” or similar terms. Using the “word tree function”, I created a chart
demonstrating frequent phrases used before and after the word “ranger” in tweets that were hashtagged “Virunga”. What is important to note here is that a relatively high percentage (1354 of
1884) of the tweets collected were ultimately “retweets” of institutional accounts such as
@savevirunga (independent advocacy group for Virunga Park), and @gorillacd (Virunga’s
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official account). Nonetheless, the retweeting of institutional accounts related to Virunga still
provides productive insights in how aspects of militarization, specifically rangers are portrayed,
perceived, and amplified.
One of the first things that is clearly apparent in the word tree is the perceived notion of
rangers as a type of “conservation hero”. Frequent phrases which follow the word “ranger”
include “risk their lives everyday”, “risking their lives to save”, “are at war to save”, and “have
been killed since 1996”. Frequent phrases which precede the word ranger include “courage and
dedication of #Virunga’s (rangers)”, “support #Fallen Rangers Fund and Widows of (rangers)”,
and “watch the story of heroic (rangers)”, thus clearly promoting the idea that rangers are noble
and willing defenders of Virunga’s endangered wildlife.
Another interesting dynamic is that the institutional account @savevirunga, which tweets
once and sometimes twice a day about the park, seems to actively promote a specific imagery of
Virunga’s ranger. The “Save Virunga” advocacy organization website states “Save Virunga
brings out the power of local communities and conveys their messages to protect the most
precious nature reserve in Africa and preserve the integrity of its ecosystems for future
generations” (Save Virunga 2018). The website however at no point lists who authors the articles
it posts, any local community members it has interviewed, or what is actually involved in
“bringing out the power of local communities” (Save Virunga 2018). Interestingly enough, the
account is prolific on twitter and seems to actively combat any view which problematizes the
role of Virunga’s rangers in conservation practice. For example, on February 7th, 2018, the
account tweeted “#Virunga #Environmental Defenders should be thought of as #heroes rather
than obstacles to #Sustainable #Development #DRC” (Twitter via @SaveVirunga 2018): in
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support of an 4article published by the Los Angeles Times newspaper about state interference in
the work of “ecowarriors”.
Non-institutional users, that is, individuals not representing specific organizations, also
tweeted about the role of rangers in the park. One individual remarked, “Also, just watched the
heartbreaking documentary @virungamovie on @netflix. Park rangers risking their lives to save
mountain gorillas, amid big oil and rebel fighters. #Virunga”. In this way, it's clear that
discourse about Virunga pervade twitter in ways that support the idea of Virunga’s ranger as
environmental heroes working for the preservation of the park’s flora and fauna in harrowing
conditions. Recently one twitter user floated the idea of nominating African wildlife rangers for
the Nobel Peace Prize. In response, the twitter account “SudantheRhino”, an account which
advocates for Rhino conservation, tweeted: “I want the names of the protectors myself, but it
would be @OlPejeta as an organization and then all African wildlife Rangers like @gorilladc
Virunga National Park, etc as a general category, ‘African Rangers’. We need EVERYONE to
RT this Nobel Peace Prize idea NOW.”5 6 (Twitter via Sudantherhino 2018). In fact, one of
Virunga’s rangers, Rodrigue Mugaruka Katembo, did win the Goldman Environmental Prize in
2017 for his role in protecting Virunga from foreign oil exploitation.7
There is no disputing the fact that Virunga’s rangers are constantly at risk from armed
violence while working in the park. As of August 2017, 160 rangers had been killed “in the line
of duty”; 8 of those deaths were in 2017 (Virunga 2017). Yet, as Marijnen and Verweijen point

4

See the LA Times’ Article “Defending the Environment Has Become a Type of Suicide Mission in Many
Parts of the World” published on December 22nd, 2017
5
Ol Pejeta is a rhino conservation area in central Kenya, the former home of Sudan, las the Northern white
Rhino
6
This tweet was not hash-tagged #Virunga, but was found through a twitter search for the phrase “Virunga
Rangers”
7
Katembo is featured prominently in the 2014 documentary “Virunga”
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out, we are never given details by any of the Virunga associated outlets about how they died, or
at whose hands (2016: 276). Instead, we are typically informed by the official Virunga website
that they died in an “attack” or “ambush” by local militias, the most commonly mentioned group
being the Mai-Mai “rebels” (Virunga 2017). Death is not just a quantifiable category, yet 150
lives lost, at a visceral level, seems to be an extremely large number.
As we take a closer look at how rangers are portrayed, both in life and death, in the park,
problems with these portrayals begin to arise. To begin with, we are never presented with the
direct opinions, thoughts, words, of the rangers themselves. There is also no listing of the
individual rangers on the Virunga Park website unless they are closely associated with a task like
Gorilla caretaking and featured in a blog post. In fact, the most information provided on the lived
experiences of the Virunga rangers is at the time of their deaths. Each time a ranger is killed, the
official Virunga website posts an obituary about their life and service to the park. For instance, in
a July 2016 web post, the park memorialized Dudunyabo Celestin, one of their recently fallen
rangers,
Célestin was originally from Bunia and joined the ranger force in 2011. He did his
comprehensive ranger training at Lulimbi Station in the Virunga’s Central Sector. His
first assignment was mountain gorilla protection in the southern sector. He also worked
from Kibati Station and helped protect the Nyiragongo volcano area. In his most recent
role, Célestin was charged with protecting the flora and fauna surrounding Mt.
Tshiaberimu, where Virunga’s only population of eastern lowland gorillas live. Virunga
National Park will provide for Celestin’s wife and children through the Fallen Ranger
Fund. If you would like to help support them and and other families of Virunga’s Fallen
Rangers, please make a donation (Virunga 2017).
What is immediately obvious about this memorialization of Celestin is that it is strictly
about his logistical role in the park. The reader is completely unaware of how he became a park
ranger, his thoughts about the park, his relationships, feelings, or really any other details that
mark the nuances of a human life. In this way, his role as a ranger is spectacularized to seem to
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revolve solely around the work of “saving Virunga”, and then projected into the world of media
to procure donations. “Fallen Rangers” have become a type of brand associated with a park fund,
not individuals’ lives lost.
The Fallen Ranger Fund, which the quote refers to, was set up in order to support the
widows and families of rangers who were killed in “the line of duty” in Virunga (Virunga 2016).
The fund originally just provided families with a monthly stipend to assist them in the loss of
their husbands or wives (Virunga 2016). In a recent turn of events however, the park has now
established a “widows workshop” in which widows of the park rangers are recruited into a type
of crafting workshop to make merchandise for the park that can be sold to tourists at the main
lodge. A post about the workshop on the park website reads,
After several years of planning and building, Virunga’s Sewing Workshop for the
Widows of Fallen Rangers has opened. The workshop was created to help widows regain
a sense of control over their lives after suffering the devastating loss of their ranger
husbands. These women have faced challenges that most people can't even imagine, yet
as you can see from the images that follow, they are doing so with grace and
determination (Virunga 2016).
The images that the post speaks of, includes pictures of smiling widows, a white conservationist
helping the widows cut the inaugural ribbon (see Appendix 3), and pictures of the napkins that
the widows have created which are to be sold to support the park (see Appendix 4).
I argue that it is difficult not to see the patterns of exploitation hidden in the
spectacularization of the lives, and deaths, of Virunga’s rangers. The glorification of their
logistical role in the park as “heroes” and the projection of this image via various media sources
renders invisible humanity and the processes which brought them to the park in the first place.
Additionally, I argue that this spectacularization of their lives in death is also marketed as a way
through which to garner funds for the park. In this same way, the exploitation of the spouses of
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deceased rangers is problematic in that their status as widows is used an avenue to generate more
funds for the operation of the park, which caused the death of their husbands in the first place. To
make matters worse, the direction of all of these processes by “white authorities” such as 8Park
director Emmanuel de Merode and partners such as the European Commission harkens back to
problematic colonial processes in which African lives were extended for resource production
with little attention paid to their individual humanity.
Additionally, in a highly populated area with little opportunity for high earning jobs,
rangers, and their widows, may not always “choose” to work for the park. While everyone
associated with the park is portrayed as entirely invested in the park’s mission, we are never told
just how they ended up working there, a topic I will address in the next section.

Colonial Natures and the Erasure of Lived Human-Environment Connection
The spectacle of Virunga’s wildlife rangers as “conservation martyrs” is clearly
problematic in the way that it relates to colonial narratives and its ability to undermine the
violent realities of working in the park. Bringing the discussion back to construction of nature,
this spectacle is also able to undermine any type of connections that rangers may have had with
the land or wildlife. I do not mean to suggest that Virunga’s rangers or staff do not want to
protect Virunga’s wildlife. Instead, I argue that this spectacularization actually renders invisible
any kind of connection between the Congolese rangers and the wildlife in Virunga. From
interviews in the “Virunga” documentary with gorilla caretaker Andre Bauma and other rangers,
it is evident that there are real emotions and complex backgrounds present in the relationships
between the staff, the land, and its non-human inhabitants. We however, are never told, in the
8

In a 2017 article by The Sunday Times, Emmanuel De Merode is referred to as “The Prince of the Congo”, a
reference which sparked outrage from a number of scholars and those aware of the DRC’s colonial past
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voices of the rangers, about their role in Virunga. In this way, western media presentations erase
Congolese voices and connections to the “natural” elements of the park, instead presenting a
highly mediated version of rangers as “conservation martyrs”.
Processes of fortress conservation, as mentioned previously, draw a physical and
metaphorical boundary between what is “natural” and what is not, in a way that reinforces the
society-nature binary. Through the mediation of this process, potential connections between
human and non-human are effectively erased, instead replaced by exploitative colonial narratives
and images of death intended to initiate donations.
Another aspect of this “Nature” is the inherently capitalist aspect. Fortress model
conservation transforms conservation landscapes to be accessible to capital markets
((Brockington and Igoe 2010). The spectacularization of the rangers’ lives renders them a type of
commodity to work for the benefit of the park. Yet, in order to for this mechanism to be
successful, their humanity, and the problematic processes which led to their premature deaths,
must be erased. In this way, there is an inherent removal of human characteristics, and human
agency in the “Nature” being created. Here, there is significant interplay with the next processes
I highlight in my thesis: gorilla conservation. In the next chapter, I will move my attention from
the western mediation of human lives in the park, to the commodification, charismatic
exploitation, or Virunga’s mountain gorillas.
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3.
Figure 6 Source: Virunga.org

4.
Figure 7 Source: Virunga.org
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Chapter V: Flagship Species: The Mountain Gorilla and the Commodification of
the Non-Human Body

"But the magic when you step through a glade and find yourself in the presence of gorillas is

indescribable. In their natural habitat, these majestic creatures will implant the most precious
memories in your mind as you get to watch infants affectionately cuddle their parents or see the
silverback male command the attention of the tribe of gorillas...”

(Excerpt from Virunga’s Profile in “World’s Best Travel Experiences”)

On most days, The Great Ape House at the Smithsonian National Zoo is packed close to
capacity with zoo-goers of all ages, hoping to catch a glimpse of its occupants. Home to two
troops of western lowland gorillas, and a troop of Bornean Orangutans, the exhibit is
undoubtedly one of the most popular attractions in the park. The building itself is set up as a type
of gallery, where the many visitors stand in the center and are able to watch the primate
occupants through a large glass wall that runs the entire span of the structure. Moving along the
glass wall, one has full view of the primates’ habitat, from the ground to the tops of the
playground equipment provided for the residents. Unlike many other exhibits, the Great Ape
house is regularly staffed with volunteers who stand throughout the building, explaining to
excited groups of visitors exactly what the animals are doing.
On my many visits to the Smithsonian National Zoo, I too sat in the Great Ape House,
taking time between the Small Mammal Exhibits and the Elephant Pavilion to observe the
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animals behind the glass. The draw that large primates like the gorillas and Orangutans have to
humans is undeniable. I often sit in amazement watching the adults solve the puzzles given to
them by their trainers, or the mothers care for their newborns. Admittedly, I also felt a sense of
guilt walking out, as I find it disturbing that someone whom I feel so closely resembles me must
spend their life behind glass.
Since human encounters during the colonial period, large primates have occupied a
central place within western conceptions of wildlife and cultural expressions of these widely held
views. From cultural phenomenon such as Curious George to Planet of the Apes to King Kong,
Westerners are seemingly both fascinated and afraid of these beings to which humans bear so
much resemblance: both seeking connection and fearing their potential abilities. In a more real
sense, primatologists such as Dr. Jane Goodall and Dian Fossey have become a type of public
hero, exalted for their ability to connect to their respective species and their devotion to the
conservation cause.
Unfortunately, it is beyond the scope of my research at this particular point to effectively
and accurately report on historic or contemporary conceptions of the relationships between
Congolese societies and the large primates of the area. For more information on the interactions
of the indigenous Batwa people and their forest environments, both in the colonial past and
present day see Trumbull (1967), or Crews (2003).
In this chapter, I will explore the discourse and ideology surrounding the conservation of
one of the most prominent large primates, the mountain gorilla. As the flagship species of
Virunga National Park, the Mountain Gorilla is extremely significant to the park’s stated
mission, and to public support of the park’s conservation efforts. Recall that Carl Akeley’s
desire to preserve mountain gorilla habitat was the original inspiration for establishing the
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protected area. Thus, while Virunga is home to many large mammals, including elephants,
hippos, and the endemic Okapi, the mountain gorilla retains an elite status amongst the park’s
wildlife.
Deconstructing the way that the mountain gorilla “archetype” is mobilized via popular
western conservation discourse is therefore imperative in order to problematize mainstream ideas
of nature as evidenced by Virunga Park. While processes of green militarization, when
deconstructed, pointed to exclusionary ideas of which landscapes constituted “Nature”, Gorilla
conservation relates to different aspects of western nature discourse, in the form of human vs
non-human, or “us” versus “them” narratives. Wrapped into the gorilla “archetype” are an array
of themes about non-human agency, the value of biodiversity, and the commodification of the
living body. In this chapter, I begin by highlighting the role of the Mountain Gorilla within the
context of conservation in Virunga, and the role of primates within western society at large.
Then, I move to address Lorimer’s concept of non-human charisma, relating the ideas back to the
popular appeal associated with animals such as the mountain-gorilla. Next, drawing from
Lorimer, and Brockington and Scholfield’s discussions of flagship species, I analyze the ways in
which the non-human charisma of the mountain gorilla is deployed as a capitalist tool, and how
it is commodified and deployed within discourses rising surrounding Virunga National Park.
Finally, I will analyze the consequences of this commodification, which manifest in direct
opposition to ideas of hybridity and new conceptions of nature.

Gorilla Beringei Beringei
The Virunga Landscape is home to a vast array of large mammals, as Emmanuel De
Merode, director of the park, states, however, “primates are without question the primary
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attraction that Virunga, with its 22 species, offers” (Languy and Merode 2009, 50). With 22
species in total, the landscape hosts populations of Golden Monkeys, Eastern Lowland Gorillas,
Mona Monkeys, and various others (Languy and Merode 2009). Out of these various species, the
Mountain Gorilla, or Gorilla Beringei Beringei, is undeniably the most internationally
recognizable.
The Gorilla Beringei Beringei is technically a sub-species of the eastern gorillas, its
counterpart is the Eastern Lowland Gorilla, which also lives within the Virunga Park boundaries
(WWF 2018). There are however, far fewer Mountain Gorilla individuals left than their eastern
cousins. Classified as “critically endangered” by the WWF, biologists estimate that there are 880
mountain gorillas left, half of which reside in the Virunga Mountain region, split between
Volcanoes National Park in Rwanda, and Virunga Park (2018, 189). As their name implies, the
Virunga gorilla population resides in high elevation on the slopes of the park’s southern sector
(Languy and Merode 2009). They have thicker fur than their lowland relatives, stand at 4 and a
half to 5 feet when fully grown, and can weigh up to 440 pounds. The species as whole has been
the subject of a massive body of research, with particular attention being paid to group dynamics,
behavior, and intelligence (see particularly Schaller 1965, Fossey 1983). Accordingly, Gorilla
Beringei Beringei retains a high-profile position on the international conservation stage and has
been the subject of various films, campaigns, and books.
Recent studies addressing the population dynamics of the Virunga gorillas indicate that
that the group as a whole has sustained a 1 percent growth rate over the past 40 years (Robbins
et. al 2011, 5). Robbins et. al suggests that this growth rate, as compared with the decline of
other gorilla populations, can likely be attributed to “extreme conservation measures” (2011, 5).
They define “extreme” conservation as “efforts targeted to deliberately increase positive human

87
influences, including the detection and veterinary treatment of potentially life-threatening
conditions and close surveillance of individual animals” (2011, 5). These measures are in
contrast to “conventional conservation” which they say emphasizes law enforcement and
community development projects (2011, 1). Despite this, Gorilla Beringei Beringei is still listed
as “critically endangered” on the IUCN Red List of Threatened Species (Robbins et al 2008).
The “justification” sub-section for the IUCN listing reads,
This assessment includes both the Virunga and the Bwindi subpopulations. There are
only about 300 mature individuals of this subspecies in both subpopulations combined,
closely approximating the threshold for criterion C under Critically Endangered. Given
the loss of 1-2% of the subspecies in 2007 due to renewed poaching and illegal killings,
the continuing political instability of the DRC region of the Virunga Volcanoes, and the
risk of disease transmission by humans or unregulated incursions into the gorillas’
habitat, there is a distinct possibility that the subspecies could experience a 25%
reduction in the next generation of ~20 years. However, as conservation efforts are reestablished and political stability returns to the region, it is also possible that this
subspecies would warrant down-listing to Endangered (Robbins et. al 2008).
As of now, the future of the species is seemingly uncertain. Consequently, Virunga park
authorities are continuing to engage with threats to the gorilla populations via these “extreme
measures”. There is a facility for orphaned gorillas in the park’s southern sector, known as the
Senkweke center, where specially trained staff raise baby gorillas who have lost parents due to
poaching, illness, etc. (VNP 2018). Additionally, the park regularly employs “Gorilla Doctors”:
specially trained, international veterinary staff, to care for injured or sick individuals (VNP
2018).
As threats to the Mountain Gorillas increase, so does the international attention paid to
their plight. In the western world, the gorilla population specific to Virunga is highly
popularized, via media campaigns, celebrity attention, and the 2014 documentary named for the
park, “Virunga”. Within the context of Virunga National Park, the figure of the mountain gorilla
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became what is known as a “flagship” conservation species, a concept that I critically explore in
the following section.

Cute, Furry, and Cuddly: Exploring Non-Human Charisma
The western fascination with the Great Apes is well documented. In recent times,
primatology has become a sort of social phenomenon through which non-human intelligence and
relationships are framed. In her seminal work “Primate Visions”, Haraway writes,
Primatologists and the animals on whose lives they reported command intense popular
interest – in natural history museums, television specials, zoos, hunting, photography,
science fiction, conservation politics, advertising, cinema, science news, greeting cards,
jokes. The animals have been claimed as privileged subjects by disparate life and human
sciences- anthropology, medicine, psychiatry, psycho-biology, reproductive physiology,
linguistics, neural biology, paleontology, and behavioral ecology. Monkeys and apes
have modeled a vast array of human problems and hopes. Most of all, in European,
American, and Japanese societies, monkeys and apes have been subjected to sustained,
culturally specific, interrogations of what it means to be ‘almost human (1989, 2).
In this way, gorillas, and their primate cousins have become a mechanism through which the
human experience can be understood, but also made separate from the “non-human”. As
Haraway mentions, the notion of the ‘almost human’ is consistently mapped onto the primate
subject thus interrogating yet sustaining the “human-animal divide”. Haraway explores the
nuances of primatology practice, drawing conclusions that point to science as not an objective
discipline, but rather a performance with implications for ideas of gender, race, and the sciencehumanities divide (1989).
While Haraway would argue that much about the human-primate relationship is unique,
many characteristics of the relationship follow similar patterns of other human-megafauna
interactions. The cultural fascination and elevation of other large, expressive mammals such as
elephants, big cats, etc. is well documented in critical conservation literature (see Lorimer 2005).
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These relationships, and their formation, are perhaps best explored through the lens of ‘nonhuman charisma’.
Lorimer defines non-human charisma as, “the distinguishing properties of a non-human
entity or process that determine its perception by humans and its subsequent evaluation” (2005,
915). Through his emphasis on “process”, Lorimer acknowledges that entities such as spaces or
ecological processes (think a waterfall or a mountain) are also capable of holding “charisma”.
His particular emphasis, however, as is mine, is on the way charisma operates on the scale of
species. Moreover, Lorimer stresses that charisma of a species is not an innate property, but
rather a relational one, that emerges in response to culturally and corporeally constrained human
bodies (Lorimer 2005, 915). In this way, we can understand charisma as a type of affective
property which triggers human and non-human connection, and a subsequent valuation of nonhuman life by humans. Other scholars too have addressed this facilitation of human and
nonhuman relations via corporeal characteristics, with Kohn (2013) noting that nonhuman
sounds, such as the barking of a dog, have the potential to point to the fact that another being
understands, and reacts to the world around it. The bark of a dog therefore, may signal that a dog
has a “self” because the act of barking at something is an act that displays understanding and
interpretation of the surrounding world. In this way, the ethological characteristics as described
by Lorimer have the ability to help humans recognize perceptive subjectivity in nonhuman being
(2013, 71).
Understanding the properties of nonhuman charisma becomes important because, as
Lorimer notes, charisma tends to play a large role in conservation prioritization (2005, 915). In
other words, non-human charisma can largely explain why mainstream western society places a
large emphasis on the conservation of elephants and gorillas, but pays little attention to the plight
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of, say, the red-barbed ant. Later, I will use non-human charisma to outline the use of the gorilla
figure as a flagship conservation species. Before this however, I believe it is worth exploring the
specifics of Lorimer’s explanation of charisma, and the tenents of what makes a species like the
mountain gorilla “charismatic”.
Lorimer outlines three distinct facets of non-human charisma: ecological charisma,
aesthetic charisma, and corporeal charisma. To begin with, the idea of ecological charisma
emanates from the discipline of ethology, otherwise known as the science of animal behavior
(Lorimer 2005). Lorimer states, “ethology starts from an understanding of a being- human or
otherwise – as an ecological entity immersed in its environment” (Lorimer 2005, 916). It follows
then, that as organisms immersed within an environment, human beings interact with a number
of other living organisms on a daily basis, which also share our same ecological space. Our
interactions with other organisms, however, depends upon our specific ethological
characteristics, or, as Lorimer puts it, the human “modus operandi” (Lorimer 2005, 916). In this
way, while we share a physical space with billions of other living things, only a certain number
are “detectable” within our limited worldview.
The important affordances in this comparative ontogenesis (Thrift 2005), which
determines an organism’s detectability, include a range of parameters that determine its
visibility, including size, colour, shape, speed, and degree of movement. They also
include aural characteristics such as the presence of absence of a noise, call, or song, and
the frequency and magnitude of this sound (917).
Other predictors of “detectability” include characteristics such as ecological rhythms (nocturnal
vs. diurnal), or whether an organism undertakes hibernation periods (Lorimer 2005). Overall,
these characteristics come together to form an organism’s detectability in relation to the ethology
of the human being. Organisms that are highly detectable to humans contain considerable
ethological overlap with us. For example, the average domestic dog has an extremely high
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detectability when compared to that of a deer tick. Additionally, Lorimer points out that
detectability can account for why most human beings don’t care much about the conservation of
an organism such as the deep-sea nematode. Thus, the more “detectable” an organism is, the
higher its ecological charisma.
Along the same lines, aesthetic charisma is also constructed via human and non-human
commonality. Lorimer writes that aesthetic charisma “relates to the aesthetic properties of an
organism’s appearance and behavior when encountered visually by an observer either in the flesh
or as textual inscription” (2005, 917). In this case, the emphasis therefore is not on the aesthetic
properties themselves, but rather in their ability to trigger an affective response in another being.
This response, as Lorimer mentions, can be good or bad, in the same way that a puppy may
trigger happy emotions in a human, but a cockroach my trigger feelings of disgust. In relation to
human and non-human interactions, there are a multitude of aesthetic characteristics that may
trigger a variety of different responses. A few, however, are worth mentioning as they pertain to
future discussion about gorillas and other megafauna. First, Lorimer points out the well-recorded
fact that humans tend to have strong positive responses to animals which closely resemble
human babies. Additionally, organisms with a large, well-defined and detectable face tend to
generate positive human emotions and attachment. Humans rely upon the face and facial
expressions to communicate in daily life, thus an organism with no conventionally defined
“face” (worms, jellyfish, etc.) triggers no response, or a negative one. In the same way, Lorimer
claims that the presence of human-like hands works to imbue of a sense of individualized
personhood, an aesthetic quality necessary for human bonding. Aesthetic qualities thus play an
equal role in determining non-human charisma as do ecological characteristics.
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Lastly, Lorimer outlines the third tenant of non-human charisma: corporeal charisma.
Corporeal charisma perhaps is not as easily defined as the previous concepts, yet is crucially
important to understanding the relational aspect of non-human charisma as a whole. Corporeal
charisma relates directly to the experiences of long-term interactions with the species in question.
Lorimer writes that corporeal charisma “refers to the affections and emotions engendered by
different organisms in their practical interactions with humans over varying time periods” (921).
Lorimer places a specific emphasis upon groups of natural historians, and their experiences with
their target organism. He notes that practitioners who routinely interact with non-human
organisms in a significant manner can usually recall a type of epiphany moment in which they
felt a type of “enchantment”, or emotions that are difficult to articulate. In this moment, Lorimer
states that a type of “animal-becoming” takes place, in which the line between the two organisms
is briefly bridged, and the interaction allows for a type of “reterritorialization” of the human
subjectivity. Thus, corporeal charisma refers directly to the ability of the non-human to trigger
this type of “animal-becoming” in its human counterpart.
Now, it quickly becomes clear in what ways the Mountain Gorilla begins to fit into the
picture of non-human charisma. As a whole, it is a highly detectable species, both in its size, its
vocal communication, and sleep/rest patterns. Humans who share spaces of residence in
proximity to Mountain Gorillas are likely well-aware of their presence (not that this is always a
good thing). Additionally, with regard to aesthetic charisma, Mountain Gorillas have a number of
features which maximize their affective influence on human beings. With large faces, humanoid
features, opposable thumbs, and clearly distinguishable individual bodies, the mountain gorilla
has all of the requirements to be especially appealing to human society. Lastly, many
practitioners who have worked with the animals note epiphany type moments which qualify as a
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type of “corporeal charisma”. Dian Fossey, Virunga-based primatologist from the 1960’s to the
late 1980’s, discusses one such moment in her memoir “Gorillas in the Mist”,
I shall never forget my first encounter with gorillas. Sound preceded sight. Odor preceded
sound in the form of an overwhelming musky-barnyard, human-like scent. The air was
suddenly rent by a series of screams followed by the rhythmic rondo of sharp pok-pok
chest beats from a great silverback male obscured behind what seemed like an
impenetrable wall of vegetation. Joan and Alan Root, some ten yards ahead on the forest
trail, motioned me to remain still. The three of us froze until the echoes of the screams
and chest beats faded. Only then did we slowly creepy forward under the cover of dense
shrubbery to about fifty feet from the group. Peeking through the vegetation, we could
distinguish an equally curious phalanx of black, leather countenanced, furry-headed
primates peering back at us. Their bright eyes darted nervously from under heavy brows
as though trying to identify us as familiar friends or possible foes. Immediately I was
struck by the physical magnificence of the huge-jet black bodies blended against the
green palette was of the thick forest foliage (Fossey 1983, 3).
In addition to the type of “shock and awe” moment that Lorimer mentions, Fossey’s quote also
displays the role ecological and aesthetic qualities in determining non-human charisma. Thus, in
this sense, the mountain gorilla becomes a highly relatable, and highly charismatic being in
relation to human subjectivity.
In his piece “Non-human Charisma”, Lorimer moves beyond the simple concepts
underlying non-human charisma to suggest that a comprehensive understanding of the topic
allows for a more developed notion of non-human agency. Non-human charisma therefore, is not
simply relational, but rather a way to understand how non-human organisms may become agents
in their influences upon human life and emotions. Lorimer writes,
nonhuman charisma thus engenders a particular form of environmental ethics. In contrast
to the panoptic, normative, utilitarian ethics of the official discourse of biodiversity
conservation – which exhorts to save everything, everywhere, to preserve our life support
system- an environmental ethic of non-human charisma is relational, ethological, and
affective. Concern for non-human organisms is here shaped by the alternative taxonomy
sketched out by the parameters of ecological, aesthetic, and corporeal charism (2005,
928).
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Lorimer’s suggestions point to non-human charisma as a potential way to bridge subject-object
dualism across the nature-society divide, or more specifically the human-nonhuman divide. He
does however, acknowledge that some of the more common manifestations of non-human
charisma in conservation practice are perhaps not as liberating.

Flagship Species and the “Conservationist Mode of Production”
Without knowing anything about contemporary conservation, and even without naming a
particular protected wildlife area, anyone exposed to mainstream western culture could likely
name an endangered species. The snow leopard, the giant panda, and the African elephant are all
examples of animals which have been thrust onto the international conservation stage as reasons
for “why” biodiversity conservation is necessary. This mobilization, and the processes
surrounding it, construct what Lorimer, and other scholars (See Brockington and Scholfield
2010, Walpole and Leader-Williams 2002, Leader-Williams and Dublin 2002) call “flagship
species” (Lorimer 2015).
Drawing from Leader-Williams and Dublin (2002), Lorimer defines a flagship species as
“popular, charismatic species that serve as symbols and rallying points to stimulate conservation
awareness and action” (2005, 228). In his discussion of the way the non-human charisma can
work to promote ideas of non-human agency, Lorimer highlights ways that “flagshipping” can be
productive, mainly to call attention to less charismatic species (2005, 228). More often however,
he recognizes that the charisma of flagship species is both spectacularized and neoliberalized in
the name of rallying conservation support (Lorimer 2015). In this way, charismatic species are
“archetyped” and deployed as mechanisms by conservation NGOs to gain material and economic
support. He writes, “affective images of charismatic species act as a commodity fetish,
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encouraging a superficial and ineffectual politics insufficient for understanding and addressing
the social and ecological complexities of conservation” (Lorimer 2015, 143).
This commodification of the non-human body, and capitalization on nonhuman charisma,
in the name of garnering private sector support for conservation has been coined by Brockington
and Scholfield (2010) as the conservationist mode of production.
Thus, I argue that in the discourse emerging from Virunga park, the mountain gorilla is
achetyped, and deployed to accrue private sector and public support for conservation within
Virunga’s boundaries. While the archetype of the gorilla is deployed in a multitude of ways, I
will place a particular emphasis on the way its which is relational charisma is affectively
commodified and used to trigger affective support for the conservation cause. Following this, I
will go on to examine the potential consequences of this archetypal mobilization, both for the
species itself and for ideas of nature.

Selling Conservation: Marketing Virunga’s Gorillas
The “conservationist mode of production”, as it relates to the mountain gorilla, is
omnipresent within media material surrounding Virunga National Park. In fact, it begins with the
logo of the park, an image with an orange background and an illustration of a silverback gorilla
looking off to the side, with the words “Virunga National Park” written along the top, and
“Democratic Republic of Congo” written along the bottom (see Appendix 1). This image appears
on everything Virunga related, from the website, to press releases, to the newly minted “Virunga
water bottle” now available for purchase (if you buy this, the website states, park authorities will
be able to provide 100 cucumbers to an orphaned baby mountain gorilla). While perhaps not
seemingly significant, the logo can be seen as the first step in the marketing of the gorilla
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archetype, making the figure of the mountain gorilla synonymous with the name of the park; thus
creating a constant association between Virunga’s institution the gorillas that live within park
boundaries.
The mobilization of the charisma of the mountain gorilla is a ubiquitous within
discourses produced by the park. The website in particular, Virunga’s main outlet to western
audiences, makes regular use of photographs of the animals in the forest, playing together, and
with rangers. As opposed to a simple representation of what it means to be a mountain gorilla
however, these images are almost always accompanied by calls for support or monetary
donations, thus making use of the gorillas’ appeal as a potential “mode of production”. Referring
back to Lorimer’s discussion of non-human charisma, these images frequently make use of the
aesthetic charisma of the animals, so to create a strong affective response. In one particularly
clear example, if you click on the “make a donation” tab of the website, you are immediately
brought to a page with a “donate” window, asking you how much you would like to contribute.
In the background of this window, however, is a screen-sized picture of a baby gorilla, staring
directly into the camera, thus invoking a charismatic connection between the baby gorilla and the
potential benefactor (see Appendix 2).
Virunga’s facebook page too presents a number of examples of the flagshipping of
charisma in the name of garnering support and funds. Much of this material centers around the
gorillas’ ability to connect with humans, and their corporeal similarities to the human mode of
existence. In one of many posts about ranger’s relationships with gorillas, we are shown a picture
of Andre Bauma (a staff member at the orphaned gorilla center) and told that he “describes
himself as both a mother and a father to the mountain gorillas he cares for on a daily basis <3”
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(Virunga National Park via Facebook 2018) (see Appendix 3). In another post, we are shown a
picture of a “grumpy” gorilla and told that,
mountain gorillas share over 98% of their DNA with humans. Meaning, Virunga’s
mountain gorillas can also get a little grumpy on a monday morning. Regardless of their
mood, our rangers are committed to protecting these amazing animals and the park that
they call home. To support the ongoing work of Virunga’s rangers visit
Virunga.org/donate (Virunga National Park via Facebook 2018) (see Appendix 4).
In this post, it's clear that human characteristics and an imposed anthropomorphization are
applied to the gorilla pictured in order to invoke a type of emotional connection that will
potentially lead to donations. Interestingly, we also see the use of the authority of “scientific”
evidence to “prove” this human-gorilla connection.
In the documentary movie “Virunga” mentioned in Chapter 3, gorillas make regular
appearances in their forest habitats and at the orphaned gorilla center in the park’s northern
sector. Placing emphasis upon the gorillas as individual, “named” beings with anthropomorphic
personalities, the movie highlights intense interpersonal connections between rangers and the
orphaned babies. The rangers pictured continuously refer to the gorillas by their names,
rendering them “humanized” individuals capable of being consumed via their “aesthetic
charisma”. Additionally, the movie, which was marketed heavily by Netflix, came out with a
number of different movie posters used to advertise the documentary. One in particular shows
what we can assume to be a mother gorilla protectively cradling her baby, reinforcing “familiar”
notions of the gorilla existence (see Appendix 5).
In the same way, a popular children’s book titled “Looking for Miza”, funded by the
Clinton Global Initiative and supported by the Congolese Nature Conservation Authority,
chronicles the “real life” plight of a baby mountain gorilla lost in the Virunga wilderness
(Hatkoff et al 2008). The book, dedicated to “The Children of the Democratic Republic of
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Congo, Rwanda, and Uganda, and to a better future, which will always include mountain
gorillas” centers a mountain gorilla family as protagonists, after their youngest member, “Miza”
mysteriously disappears. Projecting characteristics of human family dynamics onto the gorillas,
the book takes great care to emphasize that gorillas can express “human” emotions such concern
about family members and joy. However, the book also pairs these points with the efforts of park
authorities to save them, thus creating a connection between conservation efforts and humanized
features. The last line from the book states,
It is easy to believe that the members of Kabirizi’s family are joyful too. One of their
youngest members has survived and is now healthy and happy. Miza will grow up with
her family. She will continue to learn from Tumaini and Mivumbi. Kabrizi will carefully
watch over his whole troop, but we can be sure that he will always keep and extra-careful
eye on Miza, the little, lost gorilla he rescued and brought home (Hatkoff et. al 2008).
In perhaps one of the most easily identifiable instances of commodification of gorillas
within the park, visitors must purchase a “gorilla permit” in order to trek to see the gorillas
(Virunga 2018). In the way, the gorillas are quite literally turned into commodities which can be
bought via an “experience package”. These permits, and discounts on them, are frequently
advertised on Virunga’s various sites and social media pages using images that highlight the
gorilla’s charismatic features. In one particular instance on the “Visit Virunga” facebook page,
we are shown a picture of a baby gorilla staring into the camera, overlaid by the words “Off
season special: experience a one in a lifetime encounter with Virunga National Park’s wild
gorillas for $200 per person” (Visit Virunga via Facebook 2018) (See Appendix 6). In this way,
and the others mentioned above, Virunga’s gorilla population is commodified, branded, and
consumed via the deployment of their non-human charisma.
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Undermining Agency: The Consequences of Commodified Non-human Corporealities
Lorimer’s original purpose in discussing the characteristics of nonhuman charisma is to
highlight the potential of charisma to contribute to a re-conceptualizing of non-human agency.
He argues that through the acknowledgement on nonhuman charisma as a relational entity, we
can further view human-and non-human relationships as participatory on both sides, unsettling
the traditional human-nonhuman, subject-object dualism. In relation to Whatmore’s work on
hybridity, we see that an application of non-human agency can thus allow us to further
acknowledge the constant mixing of society and the wild along with the productive ontological
capacity of all living beings.
The commodification of the gorilla-body runs directly counter to Lorimer and
Whatmore’s argument for acknowledging a type of ontological co-production in the vast
menagerie of life structures. The “branding” of Virunga’s mountain gorillas in an effort to garner
profit undermines both the ecological aspects of their being by capitalizing on their similarity to
human-beings, and prevents effective engagement with more effective ideas of human-gorilla
coexistence. Additionally, in thinking about the ways the process of the commodification of the
gorillas interacts with the spectacularization of Virunga’s rangers, it’s clear that in being labeled
an affective commodity, the gorillas are humanized in a way that the people around and in
Virunga are not. So, for this particular brand of apitalist “nature” to work, human agency is
rendered invisible as in relates to people (in a way that harkens back to colonial narratives),
while nonhuman agency is taken away from the gorillas and replaced with a commodified,
humanized, agency.
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In their “Manifesto for Abundant Futures”, a declaration of proclamation of the ways in
which to promote abundant sociological futures in an era marked by the Anthropocene, Collard,
Dempsey and Sundberg state,
abundant futures include nonhuman animals, not as resources or banks of natural capital
that service humans, but as beings with their own familial, social and ecological
networks, their own lookouts, agendas, and needs. An abundant future is one in which
other-than-human have wild lives and live as ‘uncolonized others’ (Plumwood 1993 in
Collard et al. 2015).
In relegating gorillas as objects to be consumed by humans, the discourse surrounding Virunga
National Park undermines the autonomy of the nonhuman body, thus limiting the potential for a
western re-conceptualization of traditional nature-society dualism. Building off of western
consumption, in the next section I will continue this discussion through an analysis of Virunga’s
ecotourism industry and the consumption of catastrophe.
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Appendix

1.
Figure 8 Source: Virunga.org

2.
Figure 9 Source: Virunga.org
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3.
Figure 10 Source: Virunga.org

4.
Figure 11 Source: Virunga.org
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5.
Figure 12 Virungamovie.com

6.
Figure 13 source: Virunga.org
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Chapter VI: Eco-Tourism and the Mediated (Re)Production of the Nation State
“After years of civil war that claimed the lives of more than six million people and a long history
of corruption and political instability, the Democratic Republic of the Congo is not on many
travellers’ bucket list. But there is now one very good reason why they may be more interested.
Africa’s oldest national park, the beautiful and other-worldly Virunga, in the east of the country
bordering Rwanda and Uganda, reopened this year after the war ended. It is a magical place,
3,000 square miles of snow-capped mountains, glaciers, active volcanoes, lush mountain forest
and savannahs. Yet another battle is now playing out here, one between integrity and greed.”
(Excerpt from a Guardian Article Titled “Wildife Tourism in Virunga Gives New Hope to
Congo)
Every once in a while, in my time spent in Tanzania's Serengeti Park, my friends and I
would catch a glimpse of a strange object hovering over the seemingly endless sea of grass: a hot
air balloon. While we had been informed during a lecture upon our arrival that “Balloon Trips”
were a popular (and expensive) tourist attraction in the park, their slow, looming presence always
seemed out of place in contrast to the pace in which the ecosystem around us was moving. We
would look on in silent but unified disapproval, knowing well that the current occupants of the
balloon would likely finish their day with a luxurious, multi course “bush meal” catered by
uniformed wait staff, an experience far removed from the realities of both the park and the
surrounding communities. None of us disputed, however, that the views over the plains were
very likely breathtaking.
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We discussed with similar bitterness, the multiple five star lodges located within the park
boundaries. A particular object of derision was the “Serengeti Four Seasons”, a hotel where
visitors can spend $1,000 per night on a room to “get up close and intimate with lions, leopards,
and elephants - yet always feel safe and pampered” (SFS 2018). To make matters worse, the
lodge offered “safaris on horseback” to guests willing to pay an extra one to two thousand
dollars.
Putting aside the flawed logic associated with riding horses in the Serengeti (why ride
around on a large ungulate in the area with the highest concentration of big cats on the African
Continent?), it was more than the exorbitant prices and “in your face” luxury that irritated me
and my fellow students (four nights in our one-person tents may have made us a bit
disagreeable). There was something deeply unsettling about the enormous displays of wealth
being paraded around the park when we were well aware of the enforcement policies which kept
nearby residents out of it. Additionally, on the way into the Serengeti, we passed scores of white
tourists on day trips to nearby Maasai Bomas, where local people “performed” traditional dances
for them, presumably in return for payment either by the tour guides or by park authorities1.
Even though we respected the agency of the various actors involved in the tourist industry in the
park, it was hard not to wonder how the massive influx of economic wealth into the area
impacted the different “roles” people were asked to play. Additionally, it was evident that
tourism had transformed the landscape itself, producing a type of “amusement” park feel. With
tourism contributing over 5.9 billion US dollars to Tanzania’s overall economy however, it was
clear that Tanzanian authorities saw the value in cultivating the foreign tourism industry.

1

See Igoe’s “Conservation and Globalization” (2009) for an in-depth discussion of the impact of tourism and
globalization on Tanzania’s Maasai communities
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As I discuss in this chapter, various scholars have argued that tourism, specifically
ecotourism, has the ability to shape and produce landscapes so as to be competitive attractions
within the global economy (Duffy 2002, Bluwstein 2017, Brockington et al 2008, Ojeda 2012).
In a similar way to Tanzania, but to a lesser extent, The Democratic Republic of Congo has in
recent years experienced modest growth of the ecotourism industry (WTTC 2018). At the
forefront of this expansion has been Virunga National Park. Consequently, I will spend this next
chapter analyzing the various ways that the production of Virunga’s landscape for tourism
reinforces a mediated image of the DRC as a “dangerous” place, juxtaposed with the image of
the “purity” of the landscape inside the park. This, in itself, may seem counterintuitive, as Duffy
argues that in order to attract a wide tourist base, nation states are forced to market themselves as
“safe and secure”, thus erasing histories of violence and war (Duffy 2002). In response, I argue
that the promotion of ecotourism in Virunga has created a park as a type of entity apart from the
bounds of the DRC, thus rendering the violence which exists outside of it consumable.
First, in this chapter I outline the growth of tourism in Virunga and the DRC in general.
Then, drawing from authors such as Duffy, Ojeda, and Brockington, I outline the various ways in
which ecotourism has the ability to produce “national” natures. Next, using Lisle’s arguments
about the consumption of catastrophe and Baudrillard’s simulacra and simulation, I suggest that
tourist ventures in Virunga can be seen as attempts to make contact with the “real”. In
conjunction with this, I present various discursive materials about ecotourism in the park,
displaying how they reinforce nature as “pure”, thus reinforcing narratives of the DRC as the
“heart of darkness”, thus recalling and relying on colonial racist tropes. In this way, I argue,
violence and political strife (that occur at a distance) become part of the “ultimate” tourist
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package. Finally, I discuss how the production of nature via ecotourism therefore capitalizes on
the moral innocence of the wild, therefore vilifying and profiting off of regional human conflict.

Recent Tourism Trends in the DRC and Virunga
In the DRC, tourism as a whole has begun to increase in recent years, producing 1.9
percent of the National GDP as of 2016 (WTTC 2017). The industry is expected to grow
significantly, with the World Travel and Tourism Council estimating that by 2027, the industry’s
total contribution to national GDP will have grown by 6.1 percent (WTTC 2017). Virunga
experienced a recent uptick in tourism related activities. The tourism program in the park began
in 2009, based upon gorilla trekking and Mt.Nyiragongo climbs (Virunga Alliance 2018). The
Alliance claims that during the years 2010 and 2011, the Main Park lodge hosted 5,000 visitors,
generating almost 1 million USD in revenue. This number fell though, effectively to zero, after
the park was forced to close between early 2012 and January 2014 due to militia activity in the
area (Virunga Alliance 2018). Numbers recovered quickly in the years 2014-2015, bolstered by
the release of the 2014 aforementioned documentary, “Virunga”, and began climbing back up to
pre-closure statistics with 3,000 visitors annually by August 2015 (AU 2015).
A 2013 report by the WWF indicated that in “ideal” conditions tourism to Virunga has
the potential to generate 235 million USD per year in revenue, from things such as gorilla
permits and accommodation fees (WWF 2013). Additionally, the report indicates the ability of
tourism to generate employment opportunities, thus paving the way for “economic recovery
through tourism” (WWF 2013). The park has embraced the promise of the tourism industry
wholeheartedly, formulating a 4-pronged sustainable economic development plan build around
investment in sustainable energy, sustainable fisheries, agro-industry, and lastly, tourism
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(Virunga Alliance 2018). The Alliance estimates that starting in 2016, tourism was, and is still
projected to increase by 90% annually, and that the average visitor to Virunga now spends USD
$1,400 in associated park fees and accommodations payments (Virunga Alliance 2018).
Additionally, the Alliance and park authorities expect that tourism will foster economic growth
in the region and produce surplus revenue which can be used to support the park’s community
development projects (Virunga Alliance 2018).
As one of the many protected wilderness areas in East-Central Africa, Virunga has to
compete on the international tourism stage to make itself a desirable destination. As Duffy notes,
ecotourism destinations are above all a type of commodity, and are marketed and designed as
such (Duffy 2002). The park then, must cultivate a specific identity, or brand, in the context of
the DRC, in order to be an attractive and “secure” place to vacation. In the next section, I will
draw from scholars who discuss the “production” of ecotourism to begin constructing an
explanation of the type of landscapes (and discourses) ecotourism produces in Virunga.

Distinguishing the Eco-Tourist
To begin with, it’s worth quickly distinguishing between “tourism” and the more specific
“eco-tourism”. Duffy states, “Eco tourists are thought to be a new type of tourist, distinct from
mass tourists because they are environmentally conscious as well as socially and culturally
aware” (2002, 20). Building off of this, conventional tourism, specifically western tourism, is
typically conceptualized as a type of “selfish” or “wasteful” undertaking primarily for the
purpose of personal leisure (Duffy 2002). Ecotourism on the other hand, while certainly also
incorporating personal wants, aims (or at least presents the illusion of aiming) to “do good” as a
visitor to a specific site. In some cases, as Duffy mentions, this may mean forgoing certain
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amenities in the name of sustainability via self-denial, or securing reassurance that their
economic input is directly benefiting local communities (Duffy 2002).
In Virunga’s case, the park makes no claims that its facilities are environmentally
friendly in any specific ways. While the park does offer different types of “tented camp”
experiences, these too are outfitted with amenities such as full-service food options and
unlimited hot showers (Virunga 2018). What qualifies tourism to Virunga as a form of ecotourism is the fact that the park makes it abundantly clear that visiting Virunga will “help the
gorillas”. In a special piece she wrote for the guardian about tourism in Virunga, the producer of
the “Virunga” documentary film, Joanna Natasegara, writes,
It may be luxurious, but visiting Virunga will help save the gorillas, and is a statement of
support for the honourable rangers who have lost many of their colleagues in recent
times, fighting on the front line of conservation to protect an asset, not only for their
country, but for the rest of humanity” (Natasegara 2014).
Clearly, this idea has been internalized by tourists who visit the park. A tripadvisor commenter
who had apparently visited the park wrote about the gorilla permit fees, “$200, or $400, don’t
think too much about it, your contribution means a lot to manage the National Park”.2 In another
case, a tour guide wrote on the independently run, yet popular, “Save Virunga” website,
In cooperation with several trusted tour operators, Virunga Foundation and ICCN provide
exceptional opportunities for nature tourists to meet with habituated mountain gorillas
and experience other natural wonders of the park. As the use of entrance-, gorilla- or
other fees are made transparent to the travelers, and financial income clearly supports
both the management of the protected area, its wildlife as well as the surrounding
communities, results in the willingness to spend and donate relatively high amounts of
money. This way tourism is a significant financial supporter of the Virunga national park
(Bakunzi 2017).

2

I sourced this and other comments from TripAdvisor. I search the website for the page titled “Virunga
National Park
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In this way, tourism to Virunga can be classified as a form of ecotourism in that the actual act of
paying to visit the area is seen as a type of contribution. Willingness to spend money which is
going to support the gorillas, and apparently the “honorable rangers”, is given a moral quality
which makes it clear that the money is going to benefit people and animals in productive ways.
In this case, the “self-denial” or sacrifice associated with the ecotourism venture comes in the
form of paying, what would seem to many in the world as, a lot of money. Now that we have
established tourism to Virunga as a form of ecotourism, I will move to discuss the relation of the
ecotourism industry to imagery of the nation state.

The Productive (and Destructive) Capabilities of the Eco-Tourism Industry
The beginning of understanding ecotourism and its relation to the nation state requires
understanding that as a circulating commodity, ecotourism destinations must develop ways to
compete on an increasingly competitive international stage (Duffy 2002). In her work on
ecotourism in Belize, Duffy lays out the consequences of this need to compete, stating that in
order to be competitive, nation-states, particularly within the global south, have to carve out
specific tourism markets. One of the ways in which to do this, she argues, is through particular
images of nationhood. She writes, “In the process of creating this image, governments, tour
operators, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other related organizations conjure up a
peculiar idea of nationhood that is viewed through a prism designed for an external audience”
(2002, 71). What is important to note is that as opposed to other processes of nation-making,
constructions of nationhood as they relate to ecotourism tend to be transnational projects, as the
appeal of the nation is not being directed towards those who actually live in the area (Duffy
2002).
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In order to be appealing destinations, Duffy suggests that countries in the global south
must market themselves as “exotic destinations promising pristine environments untainted by
Western-style development” (2002 72). Additionally, she argues, aspects such as political
stability, “friendly locals”, and striking wilderness features are crucially important to ensuring
tourism interests (2002 72). In the quest to assure tourists that their trip will be safe then, nations
may choose to effectively erase information about crime against foreigners, armed conflict, or
terror threats (2002 72).
Duffy continues by highlighting the “performance” aspect that this type of production of
imagery requires. If a nation state markets itself in a particular way to tourists, local populations
may feel compelled to act in a certain way to “fit the bill”. For example, if NGOs and
governments market an ecotourism destination as remote and authentic, indigenous/local peoples
may feel compelled to “perform” certain personas, or worse, stereotypes, in order to appeal to
foreigners (Duffy 2002). The promotion of ecotourism destinations by transnational actors may
also rely on popular “regional” identities, such as means to belong to a certain place (for example
what it means to be “African”). In a similar vein, cultural values are shaped by the marketing of
ecotourism, and are thus commodified. Citing Hall (see chapter 1) and other scholars, Duffy
writes,
In tourism, cultures and societies become commodities to be consumed by an external
audience. McCrone, Morris and Kelly argue that the commercialization of culture is an
ideological framing of history, nature and tradition (1995, pp 8-12). The role that tourism
can play in transforming collective and individual values is inherent in ideas of
commodification, which imply that what were once cultural displays of living traditions
or a cultural text of lived authenticity becomes a cultural product, which meets the needs
of commercial tourism. Tourism can redefine social realities; when advertising creates
images of a place, these create expectations on the part of the visitor, which in turn lead
the destination to adapt to such expectations. The destination then becomes caught in a
tourist gaze from which it cannot escape without abandoning its status as a destination”
(2002, 74).
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Ojeda, in her discussion of ecotourism and paramilitary conservation enforcement in
Tayrona National Park, Colombia, presents a similar argument. Acknowledging that tourism
necessitates the production of consumable natures, she constructs an analysis of how ecotourism
destinations may produce “bodies out of place” (2012 364). In this way, artificial constructions
of “paradisiacal” vacation spots are able to designate local populations as either “eco-warriors”
(think Virunga’s Rangers), or “eco-threats” (think poachers) (2012, 364). She writes,
In addition to the problematic ways in which local elites and paramilitary forces
participate in definition of Tayrona’s public/private character, tourism-based strategies of
neoliberal conservation have had significant effects on local communities. One of its
most problematic aspects is their capacity of producing bodies out of place.
Environmental protection discourses and practices have translated into land-grabbing
mechanisms under which the protection of nature - allegedly made possible by its
commodification for tourist consumption - justifies and even legitimates the
dispossession of local community members such as fishermen, transporters, and peasants
(2012, 364).
On par with her arguments about paramilitary forces, Ojeda adds that part of constructing the
ideal wilderness involved erasing past histories of Colombian military violence (2012). Stating
that “Tayrona’s historical geographies of violence seem to contradict its effective conjuration as
a paradisiacal spot, Ojeda suggests, in the same way as Duffy, that creating and marketing an
ecotourism destination requires imageries of peace, safety, and security (2012, 361).
Intuitively, this makes sense; in order to attract visitors it seems logical that a destination,
or nation, would want to market the less controversial aspects of its identities, but this “blurring
of the truth” has serious repercussions for the lives of the nation’s citizens. As I will discuss,
however, when it comes to Virunga, internal strife and “danger discourses” are packaged within
the larger tourist appeal.
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Consuming Conflict: Virunga’s “Dangerous Allure”
In the marketing of Virunga park, we are constantly presented with images of both life
and death: heroics and heinous acts. Whether it is images of “murdered” gorillas (See Appendix
1), or a particularly striking picture of park staff lowering a fallen ranger’s coffin into his grave
(See Appendix 2), the consumer is made constantly aware that while bursting with an abundance
of wild-life, Virunga is a place continuously threatened by violent forces which seek to
undermine it, and those who support it.
Marijnen, in her most recent piece about Virunga, argues that local actors increasingly
perceive the park as separate from the whole of the DRC: a functioning “state within a state”
(Marijnen 2018). Writing that during her field work she, “met numerous Congolese observers,
who perceive the park in just that way, as a ‘state within a state’, and representatives of aid
donors who perceive the park as a place that ‘works’ in the otherwise chaotic and conflict-ridden
eastern DRC” (Marijnen 2017). Drawing from Marijnen’s conclusions, I argue that when it
comes to eco-tourism, Virunga is not portrayed as an entity belonging to the Congolese state, but
rather a morally pure transnational entity, engaged in a constant battle with armed Congolese
Militias and other “dark” forces. In a two-fold discursive process present in the consumption of
ecotourism, the park and its inhabitants are accorded extra value because of their threatened
status and the heroics associated with preservation, while the larger fabric of the Eastern Congo
falls away into a type of bloodied, conflict ridden vortex.
While Duffy and Ojeda argue that nation-states and transnational actors are motivated to
make ecotourism destinations more appealing by minimizing the conflict and political instability
which may surround them, this process is reversed in Virunga. In reality, the park can and does
assure its visitors a certain degree of personal safety (mainly through the fact that they are
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constantly accompanied by armed park guards), but the realities of the military threat to the
landscape are not erased, while the reasons for such a threat are. This ‘threat” and the actions
taken to combat it then become “alluring” for adventurous travelers and those seeking an
“authentic experience”. Take for example, a recent Telegraph article titled “Is This the World’s
Most Life Affirming Destination?” In it, the author writes,
In the Democratic Republic of the Congo there is more lightning than anywhere else in
the world. Of the 10 hotspots most affected by lightning strikes, five are in DRC. It is an
apt metaphor for a country that has been riven by civil war and exploitation, but one that
is beautiful and spirited and exciting. And there is nothing more life-affirming than sitting
on the magnificent wooden balcony of Mikeno Lodge, which overlooks the forest in
Virunga National Park, and staring out at a really violent tropical storm (Telegraph

2017).
In this way, the constant conflict that has been present in the Congo in recent years translates to
being “spirited and exciting”, while the area is afforded the same ethos as a lightning strike. In
that same article the author continues by saying,
This is not a place to see the ‘Big Five’ in a Land Rover convoy with sundowner gin and
tonics; it’s a bit more edgy than that. Anything to do with Congo is edgy; it’s part of its
allure. That isn’t to say it’s without royal approval – Virunga enjoys a healthy
relationship with the Royal Foundation, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge and Prince
Harry’s charitable trust, and Virunga’s director, Emmanuel de Merode, was a keynote
speaker at the Duke of Cambridge’s United for Wildlife launch, in 2014 (Telegraph
2017).
In an equally problematic way, we can assume that this “edginess” comes from perceptions of
poverty, conflict, and lack of infrastructure and translates to a type of “thrilling” tourist
experience. Yet at the same time, we are assured that Virunga is “sanctioned” via the approval of
high-ranking westerners, in a way which presents troubling evidence of neo-colonial processes.
The article goes on to talk about the “life affirming” experience of meeting the gorillas, and then
chronicles the 2007 murder of a gorilla family by “bandits”.
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In another article, published by Bloomberg in 2016, we see Virunga described as
inhabiting the “Heart of the Congo” (perhaps an unintentional reference to the “heart of
darkness”). A travel writer states,
In the early morning light on Mikeno Lodge’s terrace, it's hard to appreciate the risks
that DeMerode and his team face every day. Over the past decade over 150 rangers have
been killed, including two in March. De Merode himself was shot two years ago; the
gunmen were never found (Bloomberg 2016).
In another 2016 article, published by Getaway Magazine, titled “Virunga, the Wild Park with
Fire in its Soul”, wildlife journalist Scott Ramsay writes with regards to the areas surrounding
Virunga,
The state of infrastructure and roads is abysmal, even by African standards. The demand
for natural resources is a huge source of concern and conflict – armed militias profit from
illegal charcoal and fishing industries. Virunga itself is surrounded by agriculture and
hundreds of villages. For all its natural splendor, it’s a small island of immense natural
resources in a sea of humanity at odds with itself (Getaway 2016).
He then goes on to quote a safari guide, who says, “Yes, Virunga is definitely not Serengeti, or
Mara, or Kruger. It offers something so different. If you’re tired of the typical Safari, then
Virunga will blow your mind” (Getaway 2016). These quotes suggest a type of “authentic” or
adventurous experience that Virunga can provide, with its turbulent history and high stakes
conservation. It is “safe”, and it is “sanctioned”, but perhaps brings a thrill that other parks
cannot. Yet in reality, the accommodations and time spent in Virunga by tourists is entirely
separate from the conflict and poverty mentioned in these articles. One tripadvisor reviewer
states,
The Congolese staff is super nice and attentive. The tents are very comfortable, with
queen size bed, en suite bathrooms and hot showers. They even thought of small details
like including two wall outlets for your camera or phone...Another thoughtful detail: a hot
water bottle under your bed sheets at night. Food is fabulous and almost too much! Lunch
and dinner are three courses. On our gorilla tracking day, we asked about a packed lunch,
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since we departed very early and returned to Kimumba at 3pm. They don’t do packed
lunches and serve you a full 3 course meal when you return. Perhaps that will change. If
no, consider bringing a snack from Goma for the gorilla outing (Trip Advisor 2018).
In this way, the park provides an experience of safety and luxury that juxtaposes the “danger” of
the Congo as a nation. Thus, allowing tourists to experience the “thrill” and “life” that traveling
to Virunga apparently brings, while at the same time feeling like they are taking a morally
justified vacation.
Tragedy and the Search for the “Real” via Tourist Sites
A possible lens through which to explain this relationship between wilderness tourism
and Virunga’s “dangerous allure” is through Lisle’s analysis of the tourist consumption of
catastrophe. Drawing from Baudrillard, Lisle argues that the appeal of places marked by war, or
violence, or disaster originates from an intense desire to “consume catastrophe” (2002, 13). Lisle
draws a particularly telling quote from Baudrillard’s “Simulacra and Simulation” (1994),
The South is a natural producer of raw materials, the latest of which is catastrophe. The
North, for its part, specializes in the reprocessing of raw materials, and hence also in the
reprocessing of catastrophe….Other people’s destitution becomes our adventure
playground….We are the consumers of the ever delightful spectacle of poverty and
catastrophe….Our whole culture lives off this catastrophic cannibalism, relayed in
cynical mode by the news media (1994, 66-68; 2004 14).
In this quote, Baudrillard points to a twofold process in which the consumption of catastrophe is
fed by a media cycle of “charitable condescension” in which western tourists consume sites of
catastrophe and are compelled to offer “assistance”, thus securing a market for such disaster
consumption (Lisle 2004). I would argue, therefore, that this consumption and condescension
then feeds the continued colonial project through constant mediation of disaster through the
western gaze.
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While Baudrillard’s lens is a helpful one through which to begin deconstructing tourism
to Virunga, Lisle extends her argument to a more nuanced discussion of the tourist search for the
“real” in a heavily spectacularized world. In this way, drawing from Debord’s spectacle, Lisle
argues that the mediation of everyday relationships by relentless imagery renders the entire
world a type of theme park (2004, 15).3 In this way, the entire globe, even sites that would seem
unfit for the tourist experience, become a type of pre-packaged commodity ready to be consumed
(2004, 15). Lisle however, offers a particularly compelling argument in stating that essentializing
all tourists as non-critical consumers of a spectacularized world would be remiss. Instead, we
should at least recognize that some tourists as being aware of the mediation of this theme park
world (2004, 15). These tourists, Lisle argues, are instead searching for something which is
“real” or authentic, and frequently, that experience is catastrophe (2004, 15). Lisle states,
I want to defend the possibility that tourists are perfectly aware of the society of the
spectacle- that tourists know the world is mediated and commodified for their
consumption. What I am suggesting is that even for “reflexive” tourists, sites of atrocity
function in specific ways with respect to “the real”. These sites are coveted because they
are the only places left which haven’t been commodified and turned into a spectacle. In
effect, the only “real” thing anymore, the only thing that can be differentiated from the
surrounding spectacle, is catastrophe. Everything else is mediated, simulated, banal
(2004, 15).
It is quite possible to view tourists to Virunga through this lens of “seeking the real”. Bombarded
with images of dead gorillas, funerals for rangers, and discourses of the Congo as a place of
abject poverty and violence, tourists may view the “realness” of Virunga in the ever-prevalent
discourses of death, armed warfare, and martyrdom. In this way, the “fight for the park”, marked
by actors who seem (at least in media) willing to die for the cause is an “authentic” experience in
a theme-park world. The irony, of course, is that in the search for the authentic, tourists find
3

Lisle’s analysis of the production of a theme park world is reminiscent of the popular show “Westworld” in
which tourists are able to transplanted into a fake “western style” universe where they are able to commit
crimes (and consume crimes) with impunity; afterwards returning to their normal lives.
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more heavily mediated discourse, ultimately convincing them of realities and lived experiences,
which may after all, not even exist.
Safe, Sanctioned, and Thrilling: The Problematic “Nature” of Virunga’s Ecotourism
Acknowledging tourists’ potential search for the “real” in Virunga is important, yet this
search is not without consequences, both for the DRC and for constructions of Nature. Even
though ideas of Virunga as an “alluring” destination may not be rooted in the type of voyeuristic
processes that Baudrillard mentions, the search for the authentic in catastrophe is still deeply
problematic. As shown by the trip advisor comments, tourists are given just enough exposure to
the “real” experiences that they seek. Exposed to rangers, gorillas, and luxurious
accommodations, Virunga becomes a type of haven within a larger “threatening” entity, the
DRC.
In this way, ecotourism in Virunga relies heavily upon the idea that nature is a type
“morally innocent” entity. As stated above, the “realness” and life-affirming aspects of the
Virunga experience come from the “fight for the park”, and the violence that comes with it, in
the midst of what tourists may perceive as impoverished ruination. In this way, Virunga’s
“wilderness’ and the animals that live within it, retain a type of primeval innocence, that is
portrayed in western media as quite literally worth dying for. Juxtaposed to the purity of the
wild, tourists to Virunga may see the human society that is supposedly engaged in constant
conflict, or attempting to exploit the park’s resources, as morally corrupt, reinforcing a type of
barbaric archetype, reminiscent of colonial “heart of darkness” narratives.
In the way of ecotourism, these ideas become consumable and are reproduced via
Baudrillard’s explanation of the cycling of the western consumption of catastrophe and
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consequential condescension. Yet, in the same way that colonial narratives of the DRC as a
blood soaked and economically devastated wasteland can be consumed in a capitalist economy,
ideas of “pure” nature as humanity’s moral salvation in a morally corrupt world are also able to
circulate, thus, reinforcing the idea that we, as consumers, should assist in preserving this
primeval nature by any means necessary. In this way, a strict boundary is drawn between
“villainous” humans corrupted by technology and a “greedy nature”, and wilderness, the only
place left that is supposedly non-corrupted by human innocence. In this way, via ecotourism,
wilderness is morally elevated, and human life, especially in the DRC, is devalued.
Here, the potential for valuing nature and human society as two interconnected equals is
destroyed, especially as this dualism between evil-humans and good-nature garners a market
value via tourism. It also cripples any possibility that conservation in Virunga can be altered to
be more inclusive of local populations, or humans in general. Instead, it creates a desire for the
continued conflict that rangers, staff, and nearby residents have to engage with on a daily basis.
In this chapter, and the two that precede it, I provide a discursive analysis of social and
political processes in Virunga, problematizing entities such as spectacle and colonial narratives,
commodification, and the consumption of conflict. In next section, I will begin to conclude this
thesis, with a more thorough analysis of how these processes, as discussed above with the
ecotourism industry, are capable of reinforcing constructions of nature-society dualism. I will,
though, move towards thinking through possible approaches to these discourses, in order to
suggest a more productive, and potentially just, path forward.
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1.
Figure 15 Source: Virunga.org

Figure 14 Source: Virunga.org

2.
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Conclusion: Critical Evaluations and the Potential for Alternative Futures

“Without stories of progress, the world has become a terrifying place. The ruin glares at us with
the horror of its abandonment, It’s not easy to know how to make a life, much less avert
planetary destruction. Luckily there is still company, human and not human. We can still explore
the overgrown verges of our blasted landscapes-the edges of capitalist scalability, and
abandoned resource plantations. We can still catch the scent of the latent commons- and the
elusive autumn aroma.”
(Tsing (2015) “The Mushroom at the End of the World”)

In the final scene of the “Virunga” documentary, we are presented with voiceover, from
Rodrigue Katembo, Virunga central sector warden, proclaiming that he accepts that he may have
to risk his life to save the park. He states,
I have accepted to give the best of myself, so that wildlife can be safeguarded beyond all
pressure, beyond all spirit of greediness about money. Beyond all things. All that could
happen to me...I will accept it. I am not special. We cannot stand weak and say ‘SOCO
go ahead’. In the end, we will be judged if we just stand by as the park vanishes. But our
wish is that this park lives forever.
As Rodrigue’s voice is heard in the background, video clips of Virunga’s “wildlife” roll across
the screen: a pied kingfisher takes off from a branch, hippos play in the water, African buffalo
stand warily in the grass, all supplemented with wide-angle shots of Virunga’s vast landscapes.
As the voiceover progresses, the images shown begin to be people: children playing a field, a
bustling coast line where a Marabou stork walks amongst the fishermen, and a park guard
standing watch as a boat floats across Lake Edward below. The last image is, of course, the
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gorillas, staring wide-eyed into the camera. The filmmaker’s intention in this final scene is
unknown, though it is clear that Rodrigue’s monologue about sacrifice in the name of the park is
supposed to be the focal point. Each time I’ve watched the film, the final images of charismatic
megafauna and other organisms mixed with human communities, all placed under the umbrella
of “the park”, seem to me to represent a different type of human-nature coexistence than the one
that I continuously point to throughout this thesis.
At the end of the documentary I see a hint of a potentially different conception of
“nature” which values all life, human and nonhuman, as part of a living and inclusive system. As
I demonstrate in this thesis, this inclusive non-dualistic conception is not the “Nature” produced
via mainstream discursive formations surrounding Virunga National Park. Through my analysis
of three socio-ecological processes in Virunga, I find that the conception of the “natural”
produced is capitalist, commodified, and exploitative, promoting exclusionary ideas of what kind
of “life” should, or should not be, valued.
I have detailed the ways in which western discourses about different social and political
processes in Virunga National Park come to be consumed by western citizens and westernized
Congolese citizens. In the fourth chapter, we see that the spectacular mediation of militarization,
and the role of rangers, undermines “real” connections that park staff may have with the area’s
nonhuman residents. This process also reinforced models of fortress conservation, rendering
invisible the exploitative colonial processes used to create the “fortress” in the first place.
In the fifth chapter I outline the role of gorillas in Virunga. Drawing from Lorimer’s
theories of non-human charisma, it is clear that acknowledging non-human charisma as a
relational property has the potential to push forward a recognition of human and nonhuman coproduction in lived realities. As I demonstrate, in western discourse the charisma of the gorillas
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is instead “archetyped”, commodified, and used as a capitalist tool through which to accrue
economic support for the Park, thus in some ways “colonizing” the nonhuman body.
Lastly, in chapter six I combine both consumption and commodification to discuss the
role of ecotourism in the park. Using discussions of the western consumption of catastrophe, I
argue that the armed conflict in the Congo is seen as a type of “alluring image” in a world that is
spectacularized and inauthentic. In the search for this authenticity, ecotourist consumption
creates a market for violent images, a “fight for the park”, and heart of darkness narratives. In the
same way, this consumption also assigns market value to the image of “pure” nature as the only
authenticity left worth fighting for, in a world of morally corruptible human society.
In a number of ways, my thesis builds on the work of other scholars who have examined
Virunga, and related protected areas. Virunga National Park specifically, has been the subject of
work which examines the ways in which militarized conservation practice is legitimated (See
Marijnen and Verweijen 2016; 2017; 2018; 2018). These studies also incorporate discursive
analysis in order to better understand how conservation practice is mediated. What is unique
about my argument, and what I believe this thesis has contributed to conservation literature, is a
critical evaluation of the ways in which mainstream media surrounding high-profile protected
areas is able to inform and reinforce hegemonic (and oppressive conceptions of nature).
As evidenced through the course of my work, the “Nature” which is co-produced via
discursive production and consumption in Virunga is a dualistic one. Rather than moving away
from traditional us-them/society-nature constructs, westernized discourse - emerging from the
three sociopolitical processes I analyze - moves us farther away from a re-thinking of the human
and nonhuman relationship. As shown via these processes, the “Nature” which is produced is
capitalistic, exploitative, and relies heavily on the commodification of both human and non-

124
human living bodies. Colonial tropes are utilized to enable both the dehumanization and gorilla
anthropomorphization that make this commodification possible. I stated previously that this
thesis, above all, is a critical evaluation of discursively produced ideals. In this evaluation
though, I also seek to perhaps “hint” at alternative conceptions of Nature, and what type of
potential those conceptions may have for cases such as Virunga.
As I researched Virunga, and attempted to understand the ways that “N” Nature is
projected and consumed by western viewers at the expense of both the humans and nonhumans
that live there, I frequently found myself asking: what next. I don’t live near Virunga, in fact I’ve
never set foot there. I’m also a white, American, woman who can’t claim to understand what it's
like to live in a postcolonial nation that is continuously undermined, politically and
economically, by the global North. I don’t claim to have any knowledge of the lived experiences
of the communities in proximity to the park, and I don’t claim to know how to change discourses
to create a space for the expression of their conceptions of natures, their connections to the land,
and their relationships to their nonhuman neighbors. What I can do though, is problematize the
hegemonic discourses that I am exposed to, in the hope that this will potentially make room for
those voices which have been oppressed now for centuries.
Beyond Virunga, I also find myself asking the “what next” question in many of my
classes, and in my daily life, as the evidence that we will all be living in a very different (and
unpredictable) ecological world in a few short decades piles up. How do we move forward to
face the sixth extinction? Is there a socio-ecological future available to us that does not involve
placing the remaining flora and fauna under lock and key? I would argue, along with scholars
such as Escobar (1999) Tsing (2015), and Collard et. al (2015), that there may be.
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Now, in the interest of infusing a sense of hope into my argument (something that I do
surprisingly have for our socioecological futures) I would like to outline what I view as some of
the most compelling alternative conceptions of Nature, in opposition to the hegemonic
mainstream discourse of conservation in Virunga. The first of these, mentioned briefly in the
introduction, is Escobar’s “regimes of nature” and subsequent politics of hybridity (Escobar
1999). Escobar, in his analysis, deconstructs “Nature” into separate but overlapping regimes,
dividing the term into what he views as separate articulations of the “biological and historical”.
One of these regimes is “capitalist nature”, a byproduct of late capitalist process and global
imperialism (1999). The Nature constructed by the mainstream discourses examined in this
thesis, is, I argue, a form of capitalist nature. Part of Escobar’s point in defining these regimes’ a
Nature is to interrogate the balance between the regimes as they exist now.
“Capitalist Nature” receives much of our attention and protection, likely due to its ability
to generate capital as a utilitarian commodity. Existing as a corollary to this capitalist Nature is
what Escobar calls “organic natures”, based off of cultural and local knowledge. He writes,
Understanding the regime of organic nature calls for different forms of analysis;
ecosystems and production analyses are no longer sufficient. One defining feature of this
regime is the fact that nature and society are not separated ontologically. Anthropological
and ecological studies demonstrate that many rural communities in the Third World
‘construct’ nature in strikingly different ways from modern forms; they signify and use
their natural environments in very particular ways (1999, 8).
“Organic Natures” then, call for attention to be paid to seemingly subaltern conceptions of
human/nonhuman relationships and a more robust interrogation of how the “nonmainstream”
constructs ideas of the natural. In this way, Escobar suggests that paying attention to such
“organic natures” may help to inform political questions of “sustainability” and uncertain
socioecological futures (1999).
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Collard et. al’s adoption of a “pluriversal ethic” also support this notion of organic nature.
In “Manifesto for Abundant Futures”, they call for a recognition that the world is not a singular
ontological construction, but rather reality (and the reality of human/nonhuman interaction)
emerges differently across different cultures and lived experiences. In recognizing this, they
argue, we are able to stop “performing” the universe as a singular dichotomy, thus allowing the
emergence of other ways of thinking about our role as humans. They write,
If different stories perform different yet interconnected worlds, then worlding practices
can be evaluated in terms of their effects; some worldings might be wrong in the sense
that “they enact worlds (edifices) in which or with which we do not want to live, or that
do not let us live—or lets some live and not others” (Blaser, de la Cadena, and Escobar
2014). Creating abundant futures, we believe, means supporting already existing
worlding practices that enact worlds different from those produced by European
imperialism and settler colonialism (2015, 328).
I propose that this “world” of Nature suggested by the mainstream discourse surrounding
conservation in Virunga is not one in which we want to live. The Nature that I point to
continuously throughout this thesis is commodified, exploitative, and devaluing to all forms of
life. But as Collard et. al and Escobar point out, there may be other ways to conceptualize the
Nature of the future.
The trouble is then the continuing hegemony of the “European imperialism and settler
colonialism” Nature model. As I mentioned in Chapter 2, previous understanding of
human/nonhuman relationships that come from the Batwa people of the Virunga area are quite
different from those that are promoted today, yet the “capitalist” nature retains economic and
political dominance. Understanding the best ways then in which to “unearth” or make room for
alternative conceptions of ecological co-existence is not an easy question and is not one that I
can answer in this thesis. But this question is a necessary one to ask and explore.
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The effacing of entwined human and nonhuman lives hinders any possibility for
incorporating understandings of co-production in our daily lives as human beings. In a world
where capitalist ruination is rendering any “untouched wilderness” increasingly “tainted”,
Whatmore’s ideas present an opportunity for the recognition that Nature has never existed, and
will most definitely never exist again in the illusionary way it has in the past. If we are bent on
holding onto capital “N” Nature in our Anthropocene era, suddenly everything, every nonhuman
living being will no longer be pure, and what then?
Shedding the old shell of ideal wilderness allows for an imagined socio-ecological future
in which there is no boundary drawing between human-man, society-nature, subject-object, yet
still a deep respect for the unique corporeal characteristics of the world’s biodiversity. In this
way, a philosophy of acknowledging material realities as co-produced requires acknowledging
the agency and relational force of all living things; an acknowledgement that our very reality is
shaped by forces besides our own hands. This recognition, I have no doubt, will become
increasingly important as we humans are forced to turn our attention to relating to nonhumans in
new ways, as the Anthropocene progresses, fueled by seemingly unending capital accumulation.
Yet, as always, we can resist. As Tsing states, we take joy in the idea that even in the supposed
throws of ecological ruination, “there is still company” in the endless menagerie of living beings.
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